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The two main political parties in the United States put forth policies on redistribution and on is-
sues pertaining directly to race. We argue that redistributive politics in America can be fully un-
derstood only by taking account of the interconnection between these issues, and the effects of 
political competition upon the multi-dimensional party platforms.   We identify two mechanisms 
through which racism among American voters decreases the degree of redistribution that would 
otherwise obtain. Many authors have suggested that voter racism decreases the degree of redistri-
bution due to an anti-solidarity effect: that (some) voters oppose government transfer payments 
to minorities whom they view as undeserving. We point to a second effect as well: that some vot-
ers who desire redistribution nevertheless vote for the anti-redistributive party (the Republicans) 
because that party’s position on the race issue is more consonant with their own, and this, too, 
decreases the degree of redistribution. We call this the policy bundle effect.  The effect of voter 
racism on redistribution is the sum of these two effects.  We propose a formal model of multi-
dimensional political competition that enables us to estimate the magnitude of these two effects, 
and estimate the model for the period 1976-1992.  We numerically compute that during this pe-
riod voter racism reduced the income tax rate by 11-18 percentage points; the total effect decom-
poses about equally into the two sub-effects. We also find that the Democratic vote share is 5-38 
percentage points lower than it would have been, absent racism. 
JEL Categories: D3, D7, H2 
Keywords: Racism, redistribution, anti-solidarity effect, policy bundle effect, party unanimity 
Nash equilibrium, endogenous parties  1
1. Introduction 
 
It is an old theme of the Left that racism divides the American working class, thus blocking its 
attempt to redistribute national income away from capital towards labor. (See McWilliams (1939) for 
a classical study of how growers used racism to prevent farm labor from organizing.) Traditionally, 
the mechanism indicated has been that racism among workers weakens unions, which shifts revenues 
of firms towards profits and away from wages. A second mechanism, of more social democratic ori-
gins, operates through electoral politics. Racism reduces ‘compassion’ among citizens – particularly, 
in the United States, among whites towards blacks; some whites consequently vote against the redis-
tributive party (the Democrats in the US), as blacks are prominent beneficiaries of redistributive taxa-
tion.  
A renewed interest in the significance of voter racism is emerging among scholars. Alesina et al. 
(2001) regress, for a panel of countries, the degree of redistribution on the size of the country’s poor 
ethnic minority, and find a strong negative relationship. The US has the most significant, poor minor-
ity of any country in the panel, and the least redistribution. Luttmer (2001) concludes similarly: indi-
viduals decrease their support for redistribution as the share of local recipients from their own racial 
group falls. He finds that this effect is stronger if those on welfare are predominantly not working, or 
unmarried mothers. 
Purely econometric exercises do not identify mechanisms; there could be many causes for the 
observed phenomenon. These authors conjecture they are capturing an effect in which citizens vote 
against redistribution because they place a low value on equality, due to their wish not to redistribute 
to minorities. There is, however, a second effect, quite different from this one, which may also be at 
play. Political parties put forth policies on many issues – in particular, on redistribution and on racial 
issues. (The latter include policies on affirmative action, government aid to blacks, ‘law and order,’  2
prison funding, and so on.) Racially conservative citizens who desire redistribution, because they 
themselves are poor, may vote for the Republican Party, because it has the policy they prefer on the 
race issue, even though it also advocates less redistribution than these voters would like.  
Here, we will attempt to measure these two effects of voter racism on redistribution, which we 
call the anti-solidarity and policy bundle effects. Due to the anti-solidarity effect, racist voters oppose 
redistribution to the poor, who (they believe) are substantially minority. By reducing voter compas-
sion towards the poor, the anti-solidarity effect will cause both American political parties to be less 
redistributive than otherwise. Due to the policy bundle effect, some poor citizens may vote for the 
party that is anti-redistributive, even if they themselves desire some redistribution, because that party 
advocates a position on the racial issue consonant with their own. The policy bundle effect may fur-
ther reduce redistribution.
1 
We denote by voter racism an affirmation of what are conventionally viewed as conservative 
policies on the race issue, induced by anti-black affect and the belief that blacks are pushing too fast. 
(See section 2.) This is not the old-fashioned, blatant Jim Crow racism. We leave open the question of 
why the voter in question has the affect and the belief he/she does. 
The policy bundle effect to which we refer may be large because there is no third party in the 
United States that offers voters a platform of significant redistribution and racially conservative policy: 
if there were, then poor racist voters desiring redistribution could vote for it, instead of voting Repub-
lican. The policy bundle effect is a political portfolio effect: it exists because of the limited choice of 
policy combinations available to the voter in a system with only two parties. The disappeared southern 
                                                           
1 We point out, however, that the policy bundle effect of racism on redistribution is not always nega-
tive. Conceivably, if there were a large group of rich, anti-racist voters, the policy bundle effect could be 
positive. As we will see, this is not the case in the United States.  3
Democrats represented the platform just described; when these racist politicians were Democrats, 
Southern whites could vote Democratic (pro-redistribution) and be racially conservative at once. The 
policy bundle effect, we conjecture, was either nil or small during this period. One may conjecture 
that the demise of the Southern racist Democrat has reduced redistribution in the US – a conjecture we 
might be interested in testing at another time.  
Some methodological comments are in order. The current paper combines theory with econo-
metrics. Unlike Alesina et al. (2001) and Luttmer (2001), we will propose a formal model of political 
competition between parties. We will assume that the competition between the Democratic and Re-
publican parties in the US is described by that model. The model’s parameters and their confidence 
intervals will, however, be estimated from data. With the benchmark model and the estimated model 
parameters in hand, we will then perform some counterfactual experiments enabling us to compute the 
magnitude of the two effects of voter racism on redistribution. Sensitivity analyses and model confir-
mation procedures with actual data will be also employed.  
In the jargon of econometrics, our approach is semi-parametric, which means two things: first, 
that we estimate those parameters that appear in the functions explicitly specified in the model using 
parametric estimation methods; second, that other functional forms, for which economic and political 
theory provide little guidance, are estimated non-parametrically. (An example of the latter would be 
the distribution of voter types.) Our use of non-parametrically estimated density functions in the com-
putation of the model is computationally expensive, but greatly improves the model’s fit.  
Section 2 presents our operational definition of voter racism. Section 3 describes our micro-
political model, one of political competition on a two-dimensional policy space where the constituen-
cies of parties are endogenously determined. In section 4, we estimate the values of the underlying 
parameters as well as the distribution of voter types. In section 5, we calculate the equilibrium plat-
forms of the two parties using the model described in section 3, with parameter values and functions  4
estimated in section 4, and decompose the total effect of voter racism on redistribution into its two 
separate effects. Section 6 concludes. Tables and Figures discussed in the main text are gathered at the 
end of the paper. Appendices for referees (not for publication) are also provided.  
 
2. Recovering voter racism from survey data 
 
From the time of chattel slavery, through the Civil War and the Civil Rights movement of the 
1960s, racial issues have been on the political agenda. Racially tinged issues, such as welfare, crime, 
‘permissive’ judges, and government regulation, have been the subject of strenuous political debate 
and strong legislation for the last three decades. Debates are fierce when ‘race-conscious’ remedies 
such as affirmative action are on the table, as seen in the Bakke v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia case in 1978 and the Hopwood v. Texas case in 1996. 
Many commentators argue that race as a political issue has led to significant party and voter re-
alignment in American politics over the last half century. (See Carmines and Stimson (1989), Edsall 
and Edsall (1991), and Teixera and Rogers (2000) among others.) 
According to the National Election Studies (NES), about 83 percent of Southern whites de-
scribed themselves as Democrats in 1952; as of 1996, only 48 percent did. Northern whites have also 
gradually defected from the Democratic Party since 1964. In only one election since 1960 has the 
Democratic candidate received a majority of the total white vote. (See Table A-2-1 and Figure A-2-1 
in Appendix 1.) This phenomenon is sharply in contrast with the percentage of blacks voting Democ-
ratic, which has always been greater than 90%. Indeed the black vote has been a pivotal factor for the 
Democratic Party in presidential elections.   5
This pattern of voting differences across races may tell us little about voter racism; whites may 
have turned away from the Democratic Party because they oppose big government and the welfare 
state. (Abramowitz (1994) expresses one such view.)  
Explaining whites’ opposition to liberal racial policies has been the subject of extensive research 
by American social scientists over the past quarter century. Although details of this research are quite 
nuanced, the debates have mainly centered around the relative importance of two factors underlying 
American racial attitudes: (1) psychological antipathy/resentment, prejudice, and negative beliefs (in-
cluding stereotyping) against minorities; and (2) political ideology and values such as individualism 
and libertarianism. Scholars have disputed which of these factors is the principal source of public’s 
opposition to race-related policies, such as affirmative action programs. (See Kinder and Sanders 
(1996) and Sniderman and Piazza (1993).) 
How do we understand white racism in politics? Several remarks are in order. 
First, ‘the end of racism’ in American politics is often asserted from what surveys say about 
whites’ attitudes towards blacks on a few old-fashioned racial issues. It is, however, well documented 
that there is a large gulf between whites and blacks in the perception of racial inequality and its causes. 
No matter what national surveys say about whites’ attitudes towards blacks, most blacks still see ra-
cism persisting among whites. Sigelman and Welch (1991) document striking facts. As of 1989, when 
only 4% of whites characterized most whites as sharing the Ku Klux Klan’s extreme racial views, al-
most one black in four claimed that more than half of all white Americans accepted the Klan’s racial 
views. Approximately 50% of blacks perceive discrimination in the market for unskilled and skilled 
labor while only about 10-15% of whites perceive it.  
Second, political ideology is not unidimensional. One can for example be liberal in one dimen-
sion (e.g., pro-choice on abortion issues) but conservative in another dimension (e.g., opposition to 
redistribution). Thus voters’ responses on specific racial issues might be a reflection of various ideo- 6
logical components, not just racism. Consider, for instance, the variable ‘7 point aid-to-blacks score,’ 
which ranges between 1 (“governments should help blacks to improve their socio-economic position”) 
and 7 (“blacks should help themselves”). One might legitimately argue that the voter position on this 
variable could be shaped not only by racism but also by libertarianism. (Others might even argue that 
this is a variable capturing only libertarianism, not racism.) As we will see below, both racism and 
libertarianism play a role in explaining this variable, although a much larger effect is due to the former.  
Third, racism is a latent variable. It is useful to distinguish between attitude and behavior. Racial 
prejudice is attitudinal and covert while racial discrimination is behavioral and overt. One can easily 
imagine a person who holds prejudices about blacks but does not act on the basis of these attitudes. 
This prejudice might be revealed through his or her voting pattern at election time when he or she 
holds the view that a specific party or a candidate over-represents blacks.  
To address these issues, we decompose ‘political ideology’ (liberal-conservative) of whites into 
four orthogonal latent factors – racism, libertarianism, feminism, and compassion for the poor – by 
carrying out factor analyses on ten variables in the NES for each presidential election year. These four 
factors, we believe, constitute core components of American political ideology. 
The ten variables are: (1) antiblack affect, measured by the difference between a white respon-
dent’s thermometer rating of blacks and his rating of his own ethnic group; (2) the belief that blacks 
are pushing too hard, measured by the responses on the question of whether civil rights movement is 
pushing too fast; (3) thermometer rating towards the poor (4) thermometer rating towards people on 
welfare; (5) thermometer rating towards trade unions; (6) the belief that government is too strong to 
be able to respect individual responsibility and liberty; (7) the lack of trust in government; (8) ther-
mometer rating towards the women’s liberation movement; (9) perception about equal role for women; 
and (10) the scale of political ideology (a conservative-libertarian scale). (See Appendix 2 for precise 
wordings for these variables.  7
Racism is defined as a factor loading highly on (1) and (2), compassion towards the poor loads 
highly on (3)-(5), libertarianism loads highly on (6)-(7), and feminism loads highly on (8)-(9). All fac-
tors load on political ideology.  
Note that our definition of racism is conservative and much narrower than the definition given 
by proponents of so-called ‘symbolic racism,’ which attributes responses to ‘blacks lack work ethic’ to 
racism (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Instead of ‘including’ this attitude as a component of racism, we 
‘explain’ it in terms of the definition more narrowly defined.  
Four primary orthogonal factors emerge from our factor analysis across all years – with eigen-
values ranging from 1.00 to 2.5 – and these explain about 60% of the total variation of the 10 vari-
ables in each year. By construction, these factors are uncorrelated with each other and each has mean 
zero and standard deviation one.  
We also decompose the political ideology of blacks into three factors (libertarianism, compas-
sion, and feminism) using only (3)-(10) (we define blacks to be racism-free), but the discussion in this 
section will mainly focus on white voters. Factor loadings for white respondents in the two end years 
(1976 and 1992) after varimax rotation are reported in Table A-2-2 in Appendix 1. 
To see how these four ideological components affect various social attitudes of white voters, we 
ran various multivariate regressions. Table 2-1 reports some of the results from these regressions. (For 
other results, see Tables A-2-3 and A-2-4 in Appendix 1.) 
 
[Table 2-1 about here] 
Columns (1)-(3) report the regression results when the dependent variable is a measure of racial 
attitude. In all three cases, racism is the single most important factor in explaining various racial atti-
tudes in terms of the size of the coefficient and statistical significance. We learn that, in contrast to the 
popular political rhetoric, libertarianism plays very little role in explaining racial attitudes, except for  8
aid-to-blacks. Consider, for example, column (2), which takes as the dependent variable the question 
asking whether ‘blacks can get better off if they try harder.’ A majority of white voters provide posi-
tive answers to this question, and based upon this observation, it is often argued that whites oppose 
racially liberal policies because they believe that blacks lack an individualistic work ethic, a belief that 
is considered race-neutral. If this contention were true, we would expect that libertarianism, which is 
racism-free by construction, would have a highly significant coefficient; but it does not. This point is 
clearer in column (3). Racists are more likely to believe that the position of blacks has changed a lot, 
while racism-free libertarians, like feminists, say that it has not changed much. Thus our results appear 
to show that it is not racism-free libertarianism but racism camouflaged behind libertarian rhetoric 
that explains much of the white opposition to various racial policies in the United States. 
Our result is consistent with findings of other scholars. In measuring individualism or libertari-
anism, many scholars warn against treating positive answers to race-referring questions – such as 
“blacks can get better off if they try harder” – as a direct expression of individualism or libertarianism. 
Kinder and Sanders (1996) approach the issue by making use of a set of six questions in the NES that 
attempt to tap individualism in a race-neutral way (e.g., “any person who is willing to work hard has a 
good chance at succeeding”); it could be expected that those high on individualism measured in this 
way would be those most likely to oppose government action to help blacks. They find that control-
ling for social backgrounds, there is little evidence of a relationship between these two views. Kinder 
and Mendelberg (2000) thus call the view “blacks should try harder” racialized individualism in the 
sense that this kind of measure mixes convictions about individual responsibility with resentment di-
rected towards blacks. 
Why libertarianism plays very little role in explaining various racial attitudes is an interesting 
question. Pettigrew (2000) shows that authoritarianism, not libertarianism, underlies racism (and anti-
feminism) in Europe. Authoritarianism is associated with restoring traditional values, strengthening  9
patriotic and family feelings, pursuing a strong nationalist, racist or anti-Communist policy, and rein-
forcing respect for authority, all of which may involve limiting ‘disapproved lifestyles.’ Libertarians 
may see the racist and chauvinistic attitude of authoritarians as opposing their commitment to personal 
freedom. Indeed there is no reason to believe that true libertarians should oppose the liberalization of 
laws concerning homosexuality, divorce, abortion, anti-racism etc., 
The US data reveal a similar pattern. (See Table A-2-4 in Appendix 1.) It appears that racism is 
positively correlated with authoritarian and traditionalist values. For instance, racism is positively cor-
related with support for defense spending, while libertarianism is (insignificantly) negatively corre-
lated with it (column 13). Racists strongly prefer to solve the urban unrest problem by force, while 
libertarians’ support for force is much weaker (column 14).  Libertarians are neutral about the author-
ity of the bible, school prayer, and abortion, but racists are strongly in favor of school prayer, hold 
firm beliefs in the bible’s authority, and take a strong anti-abortion position, even after controlling for 
a religion effect (columns 15-17). 
Indeed, libertarians and racists differ in several ways. Libertarians are strongly against increas-
ing public school spending but the effect of racism is much weaker (column 4). Although libertarians 
strongly believe that the government wastes tax money (column 10), this belief is not strongly corre-
lated with the racism variable. Thus it appears that racism-free libertarians are consistent in opposing 
any kind of government spending (except environmental), although coefficients are insignificant in 
many cases. Racists, on the other hand, exhibit different attitudes to different spending programs.  
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2-1 also show that the income variable is very weakly associated with 
racial views. In most cases, the coefficients are not significant, and even in the significant cases the 
size of the coefficient is very small. One popular contention is that whites oppose racially liberal poli-
cies because whites are richer than minorities on average and these policies benefit only poor minori- 10
ties at the cost of whites. But our results suggest that whites do not see racial policies as redistributive 
ones that are costly to them.
2 
Table 2-1 also examines the importance of the ideological factors in shaping political pref-
erences: see columns (4)-(6).  
At the beginning of this section, we documented that there was large-scale white flight from the 
Democratic Party in the past three decades. What drove the white flight? 
To estimate the effects of different types of issues on white flight from the Democratic Party, we con-
ducted probit analyses of voting behavior separately for those who declare that they are Democrats 
and for those who declare that they are Republicans. The dependent variable in this analysis is party 
defection: among the self-declared Democrats, those who vote D are coded 0; those who had defected 
from the Democratic Party (i.e., those who voted for either R or a third candidate) are coded 1. Simi-
larly, among the self-declared Republicans, those who voted R are coded 0; those who defected are 
coded 1. 
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 2-1 show that the defection of Democrats was largely due to their 
dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party’s racial liberalism, whereas the defection of Republicans 
was mainly due to their dissatisfaction with the Republican party’s conservatism on the gender/family 
issue. Poor economic performance under a party’s incumbency is also an important factor explaining 
the defection from that party. In contrast to Abramowitz’s (1994) argument that the large-scale defec-
tion of whites from the Democratic Party is mainly due to traditional Democrats’ becoming increas-
ingly fed up with big government and the welfare state, the libertarianism variable is statistically in-
significant and carries a negative coefficient. 
                                                           
2 We checked a possible non-linear effect by adding a quadratic term of the income variable and by 
regressing against the log of income. There is no evidence that income exercises a non-linear effect.   11
Column (6) shows the result of our probit regression on voting pattern. Because there are only 
two parties, we report only the R vote share. Again racism, compassion, and feminism show up as im-
portant explanatory variables, but libertarianism does not. Figure 2-1 shows the slope of the regression 
equation with respect to each component of political ideology, together with 95% asymptotic confi-
dence intervals; the graph is almost flat with respect to libertarianism. 
 
[Figure 2-1about here] 
We have seen the importance of voter racism in various ways; what matters for our purposes is 
the voter’s position on politically salient racial issues, such as affirmative action or the government’s 
aid to minorities, not the racism per se. One variable that measures the voter position on racial issues 
is the ‘7 point aid-to-blacks score.’ Complications of interpretation arise, however, because the voter 
position on aid-to-blacks could be shaped by many factors, not just by racism. For instance, column 
(1) of Table 2-1 shows that libertarianism plays some role in explaining this variable, although a much 
larger effect is due to racism. Simply treating voters who are not in favor of aid-to-blacks as racist 
would overestimate the extent of racial conservatism in the US. 
We therefore construct the aid-to-blacks score induced only by voter racism as follows. The aid-
to-blacks variable runs from 1 to 7, but let us assume that voters’ true attitudinal value on aid-to-
blacks lies continuously in the interval  ] 5 . 7 , 5 . 0 [ . For the samples consisting of white respondents, we 
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where Z is the vector of all 
other variables in the regression (those appearing in Table 2-1) and ν is the error term. Then ‘racism- 12
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, where Z is the mean value of the vector Z. This procedure gen-
erates a policy position variable whose variation is explained only by the variation of racism after con-
trolling for other explanatory variables. It also guarantees that our racism-induced aid-to-blacks scores 
have the same support as the original aid-to-blacks scores. The racism-induced aid-to-blacks is our 
measure of voters’ racial policy position. For blacks we assign the score of 1.
3 
 
3. The equilibrium model 
 
In this section we present a model of political competition between two parties where the policy 
space is two-dimensional; one dimension of competition concerns redistribution, and the other, racial 
policy.  Parties will propose, in their platforms, both a fiscal policy and a policy on the race issue. The 
model of multi-dimensional political competition is that of Roemer (2001), called party unanimity 
Nash equilibrium with endogenous parties (PUNEEP). Parties will have differentiated platforms at the 
equilibrium. Our exposition will be minimal; the reader is referred to Roemer (2001) for more detail. 
 
A. Definition and equilibrium 
The model takes as data the distribution of voter preferences over an issue space, and produces 
as output: (1) a partition of the polity into two parties, (2) two policy vectors (or platforms) that parties 
propose in competitive political equilibrium, and (3) the expected vote share that each party receives 
                                                           
3 When we estimate the distribution of voter types, however, we avoid the problem of censoring by 
assuming that blacks are distributed on the support of [0.5,1.5] according to a normal distribution with  13
in the election. Formally, we take as data a set of voter types 
n H R ⊂ , a probability measure P on H , 
a policy space 
m T R ⊂ , and a profile of voter utility functions on T, where  ) (.;η v  is the utility func-
tion of a voter type  H ∈ η  on T. 
The theory produces, given  } , , , { T v H P , a two-dimensional manifold of equilibria, which we 
will denote  )} ( ), ( ), ( ), ( { i i i i
R D R D τ τ Γ Γ .  Each i indexes one equilibrium; in the i
th  equilibrium, Γ
D(i) 
is the set of voter types who belong to and vote for the Democratic party, Γ
R(i) is the set of voter types 
who belong to and vote for the Republican party,  T i
D ∈ τ ) (  is the platform of the Democratic party in 
this equilibrium, and  T i
R ∈ τ ) (  is the platform of the Republican party in the equilibrium. 
We proceed to define the equilibrium concept. It is presumed that there are two political parties, 
and that each party’s decision makers comprise three factions: Opportunists, Reformists, and Militants. 
Suppose that the constituents of party D are denoted by the set of types  H
D ⊂ Γ , and the con-
stituents of party R are denoted by the set of types 
D R H Γ = Γ \ . Define 
) ( ) ; ( ) ( ) ( η η τ η = τ ∫ Γ
D d v q V
D D P ,                                          (2) 
and 
) ( ) ; ( ) ( ) ( η η τ η = τ ∫Γ
R d v q V
R R P ,                                         (3) 
where q
J(η) is a weight function given to members of party J for J=D,R. Hence 
J V  is the weighted 
average utility function of party J’s constituents. In the ideal case of perfectly representative democ-
racy, the weights would be equal for all η in both parties. In reality, however, party platforms are 
greatly influenced by, say, campaign contributions. Bartels (2002) examines the differential respon-
siveness of U.S. senators to the preferences of rich and poor constituents, and finds that on average, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
mean 1 and a small variance.  See section 4.  14
constituents at the 75th percentile of the income distribution have almost three times as much influ-
ence on senators’ general voting patterns as those at the 25th percentile. The weight function is intro-
duced as a short-cut to capture the unequal influence of constituents on party policy. 
In an election between two policy platforms, T
R D ∈ τ τ , , denote the probability that 
D τ defeats 
R τ  by  ) , (
R D τ τ π , on which more below. The three factions in each party have different interests, 
which induce their different payoff functions.   The Opportunists in a party wish to choose a policy 
that will maximize their party’s probability of victory.  The Reformists wish to choose a policy that 
will maximize the expected utility of the party, using the utility function V
J (J= D or R).  The Militants 
are unconcerned about immediate victory; they wish to announce a policy as close as possible to the 
(weighted) ideal policy of their constituents (members). Thus the three payoff functions of these fac-
tions in the D party, on  T T × , are given by: 
) , ( ) , (
R D R D Opp D τ τ π = τ τ Π
− ,                                          (4) 
) ( )) , ( 1 ( ) ( ) , ( ) , (
Ref R D R D D D R D R D D V V τ τ τ π − + τ τ τ π = τ τ Π
− ,           (5) 
) ( ) , (
D D R D Mil D V τ = τ τ Π
− ,                                          (6) 
In like manner, we define 
Opp R− Π , 
Ref − Π
R , and 
Mil R− Π . 
 
Definition: A party unanimity Nash equilibrium with endogenous parties (PUNEEP) is a parti-
tion 
R D H Γ ∪ Γ = ,  φ = Γ ∩ Γ
R D , and a pair of policies  T T
R D × ∈ τ τ ) , (  such that: 
(1) there is no  T ∈ τ  such that  ) , ( ) , (
R D f D R f D τ τ Π ≥ τ τ Π
− − , for f = Opp, Ref, Mil, with at least 
one strict inequality; 
(2) there is no  T ∈ τ  such that  ) , ( ) , (
R D f R D f R τ τ Π ≥ τ τ Π
− − , for f = Opp, Ref, Mil, with at least 
one strict inequality; and  15
(3) given  ) , (
R D τ τ ,                ) ; ( ) ; ( η τ ≥ η τ ⇒ Γ ∈ η
R D D v v , 
) ; ( ) ; ( η τ ≥ η τ ⇒ Γ ∈ η
D R R v v . 
 
Remark 1: Condition (1) can be viewed as modeling the idea that, facing the policy 
R τ  pro-
posed by party R, the three factions in party D have bargained internally to a proposal 
D τ , because 
D τ  
lies on the Pareto mini-frontier of D’s three factions’ payoff functions, given 
R τ . In like manner, con-
dition (2) models the idea that 
R τ  is a bargaining outcome among Right’s three factions, facing 
D τ . 
So a PUNEEP incorporates competition between parties (in the sense of Nash equilibrium) and bar-
gaining among internal factions. (Indeed, it can be shown (Roemer, 2001, Chapter 8) that with further 
restrictions, we can characterize the internal conflict as Nash bargaining.) A formula for the inner 
party bargaining power of factions will be presented in section 3.E. We do not specify the relative 
bargaining strengths of factions a priori, because, first, we do not know the empirical bargaining 
power of the factions, and second, we cannot be sure that equilibrium will exist, with respect to any 
given pre-specified pair of relative bargaining strengths. Condition (3) is a condition of membership 
stability; it says that no party member prefers the opposition party’s policy at the equilibrium. 
Remark 2: It is easy to show that the Reformists are gratuitous: that is, we can excise them from 
the construction, and the set of equilibria does not change (Roemer, 2001, Chapter 8). We use this re-
mark in the following characterization of PUNEEP. 
 
We proceed to a local characterization of PUNEEPs that are in the interior of  T T × .  
Suppose 



















= τ ∇ , and 
)} ; ( ) ; ( | { ) , ( η τ ≥ η τ ∈ η = τ τ Ω
R D R D v v H .   16
Then a PUNEEP is a partition 
R D Γ ∪ Γ  of H and a policy pair  T T
R D × ∈ τ τ ) , (  such that for 
some  + ∈R
R D x x , , 
) ( ) , (
D D D R D
D V x τ ∇ = τ τ π ∇ − ,                                        (7) 
) ( ) , (
R R R R D
R V x τ ∇ = τ τ π ∇ ,                                        (8) 
) , (
R D D τ τ Ω = Γ , 
D R H Γ = Γ \ .                                        (9) 
Equation (7) says that, given 
R τ , there is no direction in T at 
D τ  which will increase the payoffs 
of both Opportunists and Militants of party D, and equation (8) implies the analogous statement for 
party R’s Opportunists and Militants. These two equations say that the indifference curves of the Op-
portunists and the Militants in party J are tangent at the equilibrium. Equation (9) says that party D’s 
constituents are exactly those voters who weakly prefer policy 
D τ . By Remark 2, these are the neces-
sary conditions that characterize a PUNEEP.  
Note that equations (7) and (8) comprise 2m equations in 2m+2 unknowns: 
2 2 ) , , , (
+ ∈ τ τ
m R D R D x x R . Consequently, if there are any solutions, we can expect a 2-manifold of 
them. (The dimensionality of the solution manifold is related to the number of factions, not the dimension 
of the policy space. For further discussion, see the aforementioned Roemer citation.)  
We proceed to discuss our application of the model to the present paper. 
 
B. Preferences, type space, and policy space 
We postulate that the economic position of an individual h is given by his/her family head’s real 
wage rate, denoted by  h w ˆ  and called the representative wage of individual h. The representative wage 
of individual h is an individual wage except for wives.  It coincides with his/her own wage for singles 
and married males but corresponds to the husband’s wage for a married female. The racial position of  17
voter h is, on the other hand, completely individualistic; we denote it by  h ρ ; a wife’s racial position is 
allowed to differ from her husband’s. We measure the racial position of voters by the ‘racism-induced 
aid-to-blacks’ that we constructed in section 2. 
The type of voter h is thus characterized by a pair  H w h h ∈ ρ = η ) , ˆ (  and the type space is two-
dimensional. (Do not confuse h with η. Letter h is an index for individuals while η is a voter type.) 
The distribution of voter types is given by a joint density function  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ | ( w f w g ρ . The distribution 
function for  (.) f  is  (.) F  and the distribution function for  ) ˆ | (. w g  is  ) ˆ | (. w G . 
The justification for our model specification—i.e., that a voter’s economic position is character-
ized by his/her representative wage while his/her racial position is individualistic –  is threefold. First, 
many tax-benefit policies in the US are applied at the family level. Consumption and labor participa-
tion behavior of an individual can be properly understood only within the family framework. Second, 
labor supply behavior may be different between males and females, in particular for married couples. 
Third, voting behavior on the tax rate will typically depend on family income, not individual income, 
but voting behavior on the racial issue can be quite different  among the members of the same family 
(although there may be a strong correlation among family members). For instance, although her actual 
earned income is zero, a non-working housewife living with a rich husband may vote like a rich indi-
vidual on tax rates. She may, however, be more liberal than her husband on the racial issue. Our utility 
function will permit this possibility. 
We postulate that a voter has direct preferences over vectors  ) , , , ( r E L x
f
h h , where xh is the con-
sumption of goods and services of voter h at the family level, 
f
h L  is the vector of working hours of the 
voter’s family members (hence  h
f
h L L =  if h is single, and  ) , ( ) ( ) ( h F h M
f
h L L L =  if he/she is married, 
where M(h) (F(h)) stands for the male (female) member of h’s family), E is a measure of equality in  18
the distribution of family consumption (which we call solidarity), and r is the position of the elected 
government on racial issues. 
More specifically, the direct utility function of an individual h is of the form: 
, ) ( ) (
2
) , ( ) , ˆ ; , , , ( 2 0
2 E r L x w r E L x U h h
f
h h h h
f
h h ρ δ − δ + ρ −
γ





− λ β +
− λ β + − λ β +
= φ
single   is     if ) ( ) (
married   is     if ) ( ) ( ) (
) , (
) ( ) (
h L Log x Log
h L Log L Log x Log
L x
h S S h
h F F F h M M M h f
h h  











Log E  is the log ratio of the consumption of the family at the 25
th percentile of the in-
come distribution to that at the 75
th percentile. 
This utility function consists of three parts: the sub-utility function  (.) φ  defined over consump-
tion and labor participation of family members, the preferences over the race issue, and preferences 
for equality. 
Voters’ preferences with regard to the race issue are Euclidean, where the parameter γ measures 
the relative salience of the race issue. The coefficient of the equality term E measures the extent to 
which voters value equality in the distribution of consumption. Note that the coefficient of E is nega-
tively related to voter’s degree of racism (ρh), assuming that  0 2 > δ .  Larger ρ means a more racist 
voter, and so the anti-solidarity effect of racism is embodied in the parameter δ2 (the more positive the 
coefficient δ2, the stronger the anti-solidarity effect). The policy bundle effect, on the other hand, will 
depend on the parameter γ. 
Each political party will propose an affine tax policy  ) , ( b t , applied to family income, and a ra-
cial policy, r. The policy vector is applied to all individuals, once determined through political compe-
tition.  19
Let Y be the earned family income and O other non-wage income (usually consisting of asset in-
come, minus deductions and exemptions). Then if the tax rate is t and the lump-sum payment is b, 
post-fisc income (which we call ‘consumption’) will be 
b O Y t x h h h + + − = ) )( 1 ( .                                        (11) 
 
C. Labor supply decision of household members 
Each individual of the household chooses his/her labor supply by optimizing against the tax pol-
icy and the market wage rate. We first describe the labor supply decision of married couples. To avoid 
cluttering the notation, we will drop h henceforth. 








− ) 1 (
,                                                       (12) 
where s = M, F, and  b O L w L w t x F F M M + + + − = ) )( 1 ( . (Remark: We use the capital letter S to de-
note ‘singles,’ and the small letter s as an index for ‘sexes.’)  Rearranging terms for both sexes, we 



















































=  for females.              (14) 
To maintain the two dimensional type space, we assume that female wage rates are proportional 
to male wage rates: M F w k w 1 =  for married couples. Empirically, the female wage rate is represented 
quite accurately as a proportion of the male wage rate. For a nonworking housewife, wF is her imputed 
wage rate, which is positive if her husband is working.  20
Solving equations (13) and (14) simultaneously and using the facts that  M F w k w 1 =  and 
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= .              (16) 
We derived the labor supply functions for married couples. For singles, we do not have to con-
























=                                 (17) 
where w ˆ  is his/her own wage. 
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− = .         (19) 
‘Other non-wage income’ is usually generated from savings, the source of which is past labor 
income or past other income (i.e., the past pre-fisc income).  We assume that ‘other income’ is propor- 21
tional to the current pre-fisc income:  W k O 3 =  (see section 4). Past pre-fisc income is highly corre-















= .                                 (20) 
Equation (20) simply states that the pre-fisc income W is proportional to labor income, where the pro-
portion coefficient is greater than 1, due to the existence of other non-wage income.
4 
As we said, taxes are imposed on pre-fisc family income, so that consumption is computed by 
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w t Log b B k w A t Log
w t Log b B k w A t Log
w b t L w b t x
f (21) 
In principle, one could estimate  s ' β  and  s ' λ  for married couples and singles separately, but this 
would require a tremendous amount of computation time. To reduce our computation time we will 
estimate them for married couples only and then simply impute  F M S β + β = β   and  F M S k λ + λ = λ 1  
for singles. In other words, it is assumed that the indirect subutility functions are identical for both 
married couples and singles.
5 
                                                           
4 Since O is the asset income accumulated from the past labor income, not current labor income, 
voters take O as given when they choose labor supply, and so we did not use the relationship between O 
and W when we derived the labor supply functions. 
5 Our approach is justified if an allocation of individual time between work and leisure for singles is 
similar to the allocation of family time between work and leisure for married couples, and the total en-
dowment of time available for singles  ) ( S λ is similar to the total endowment of time available at the family 
level for married couples  ) ( 1 F M k λ + λ .   22
 
D. Government budget constraint 
It remains to derive the government budget equation. We assume government revenues are used 
in financing lump-sum redistribution, b, and providing publicly provided goods, C, where the per cap-
ita spending on publicly provided goods is given and exogenous. 












. This is because labor income is zero for individuals with low wages, given a positive 
tax rate and government transfers. Hence the government’s budget constraint is 
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1
ˆ (
) 1 ( 1
1
.               (22) 
The amount of transfer, b, is determined by solving the integral equation (22). The budget constraint 
will enable us to solve for b as a function of t, and we therefore write  ) (t b b = . Consequently, we now 
write policies as ordered pairs 
2 ) , ( R ∈ r t . The policy space is two-dimensional. 
Since the left-hand side expression of equation (22) is decreasing in b, the equation has a unique 
solution. If C>0, the function b(t) is zero at a positive tax rate. The minimum tax rate that makes b(t) 





























)) 1 ( 1 (
, where  w µ  is the mean wage rate. We will estimate the transfer 
function b(t), or Laffer curve, later in section 4; it is hump-shaped in t (see below). If  max t  is the tax 
rate that maximizes b(t), the equilibrium tax rates at PUNEEPs always lie in the interval  ] , [ max min t t .  23
The indirect utility function, after substituting ) (t b , is given by 
) (
~
) ( ) (
2
) ˆ ; (
~
) , ˆ ; , ( 2 0
2 t E r w t w r t v ρ δ − δ + ρ −
γ
− φ = ρ ,             (24) 
where   )) ˆ ), ( , ( ), ˆ ), ( , ( ( ) ˆ ; (
~
w t b t L w t b t x w t
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w t b t x
w t b t x
Log t E . The function v, so 
defined, is the function  R → ×H T v:  of the formal definition in section 3.A. 
 
E. Computation of PUNEEP 
Let  ) , ( r t = τ   be a policy vector. We compute that the set of types that prefer a policy 
) , (
D D D r t = τ  to a policy  ) , (
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− δ + − γ
− δ + −
γ
+ φ − φ
= τ τ Ψ  (26) 
The voting fraction for party D is defined by  )) , ( ( ) , (
R D R D τ τ Ω = τ τ ϕ P . 




( ) ( 2 > − δ + − γ
R D D R t E t E r r , 
and in that case it follows from (25) that the expected vote share is 
) ( ) | ) , , ( ( ) ( ) | ( ) , (
0 0
) , , (
0 w dF w w G w dF w dG
R D w R D
R D
∫ ∫∫
∞ ∞τ τ Ψ
τ τ Ψ = ρ = τ τ ϕ .   (27) 
(The other case can be studied in a similar manner by symmetry.) 
However, we postulate that there is some uncertainty about how citizens will vote, due to 
abstention, misperception of policies by voters, scandals, and so on.  Parties estimate the fraction  24
of citizens who will vote for each party, but these estimates are subject to a margin of error. We 
summarize this by positing that there is only a probability that, if the voters are offered the 
choice(τ
D,τ
R), one policy will win. We only postulate that the probability that the D policy wins 
is a strictly increasing function of the expected vote share; that is,  )), , ( ( ) , (
R D R D τ τ ϕ ζ = τ τ π  
where ζ :[0,1]→[0,1] is a strictly increasing function. 
Note that we can characterize the opportunists as wishing to maximize expected vote share, 
since probability of victory is just an increasing transformation of expected vote share. This means 
that the policies in PUNEEPs are independent of the  (.) ζ . We utilize this below. 
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,        (29 a & b) 
where  ) | (. w g  is the density of  ) | (. w G . 
We turn to discuss the weight function  (.) q  given in equations (2) and (3). Because the rich 
contribute disproportionately more than the poor, we take the weight functions to be convex up to a 










w w w q q q w q
w q
1
) exp( ) ( ˆ
) (
2 1 0 ,                                  (30) 
where  ) ( ˆ w q  satisfies  0 ) 0 ( ˆ = q  and  1 ) ( ˆ = cap w q . We set  cap w  as the 99
th centile of the wage rate dis-
tribution. (So all individuals whose incomes are greater than the 99
th percentile have equal weights.)  25







q . The 
value of  2 q  is estimated using Bartels’ (2002) result that constituents at the 75th percentile of the in-
come distribution have three times as much influence as those at the 25th percentile . 
We compute the bargaining power of the two factions in each party at a PUNEEP. Suppose 
J
opp α  is the Nash bargaining weight of the opportunist faction in party J and 
J τ  is the equilibrium 
party platform of party J. Then the bargaining power of militants against opportunists in party J is 
) (














x ,                                        (31) 
where  R D J , = ,  J J ≠
' ,  ) , (
R D τ τ = τ . See Roemer (2001, Chapter 8) for the derivation.  
 
F. The policy bundle effect and the anti-solidarity effect 
We provide a preview of our strategy. In section 4, we will estimate the distribution of types and 
all the parameters of the utility function. Our model specification at these estimated values will be ex-
tremely good in predicting observed values. We then perform two counterfactual experiments. 
First, we counterfactually run an election in which taxation is the only policy. Thus, we assume 
that the government’s racial policy is exogenously fixed at some  r r = . (This is equivalent to assum-
ing that 0 = γ .) In this experiment, the phenomenon of poor, racist voters voting Republican because 
the Republicans put forth racist positions (i.e., the policy bundle effect) will not exist, because neither 
party offers a position on race. However, voters will still be equipped with their anti-solidaristic pref-
erences, which are, in part, a consequence of racism, and those continue to influence the equilibrium 
tax rate. The difference between the tax rates in the equilibria of this counterfactual and the tax policy 
in the full model is the policy bundle effect of racism.  26
We next run a second experiment in which we continue to assume that the race issue is not a 
policy issue; we also now assume that all voters have non-racist preferences -- that is, we assign the 
lowest possible value of ρ, i.e., ρmin, to all voters. We again compute PUNEEPs by solving equations 
(28a) and (29a).  The tax policies in these PUNEEPs are what we predict taxes would be if racial atti-
tudes were neither reducing solidarity among citizens nor were the policy bundle effect active. 
Schematically, our decomposition procedure is as follows. Let 
J t  be equilibrium tax policy for 
party J. Then for each party J the total effect of voter racism on the tax rate can be decomposed into: 
effect.   solidarity - anti ) , r (r - ) r r (
effect   bundle policy  ) r (r - model)   full (
effect   total ) , r (r - model)   full (
min
min
ρ = ρ = = +
= =







           (32) 
One could say that the degree of redistribution sans the anti-solidarity effect and the policy 
bundle effect is what democratic politics would produce in the United States if the polity were as ra-
cially homogeneous as, let us say, Norway was before 1970. 
We conclude this section with a methodological remark. Consider the utility function (24) and 
suppose that an individual derives from the policy of party J the random utility of 
J J J J J t E r w t v ε + ρ δ − δ + ρ −
γ
− φ = ) (
~





2 ,                    (33) 
where J=D, R is an index for a party, and 
J ε  is a random error term. Then at the observed vector of 
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                         (34) 
Note that 




obs r r    can be expanded into  )
2











r r . Rearranging 
terms of (34) while using this expansion, we have  27

















D R R D r r t E t E w t w t obs obs        (35) 
The first term on the right-hand side of expression (35) is a function of w while the second term 




w t w t
D R
obs obs φ − φ  can be approximated by a linear 
(or log-linear) function of  income and other demographic variables such as education, and 
R D ε − ε ≡ ε
*  is distributed by a distribution function Φ, one may be able to run a binary choice re-
gression model with variables measuring income, racial position, and other controls.  
But as is clear from equation (35), what can be estimated is the size of 








obs r r t E t E − γ − − δ . This is an identification problem in econometrics, but points out 
an important issue in empirical studies on the politics of race. Many empirical researchers set similar 
specifications to (35) to determine the effect of ‘racism’ on voting behavior, and our regression (6) in 
Table 2-1 is also of this type. But as equation (35) shows, the coefficient of ρ combines two effects 
(the policy bundle effect and the anti-solidarity effect), because it involves both  2 δ , associated with 
the anti-solidarity effect, and γ, associated with the policy bundle effect.  
 
4. Estimation of the data in the model 
 
We estimate the parameter values of the utility function, marginal tax rates and transfer pay-
ments, the joint distribution of voter traits, and the observed policies of the two parties, etc., using two 
sources of micro data: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the National Election Studies 
(NES). Our discussion will be brief, highlighting only the important issues. Details of our estimation 
procedure are described in Appendix 4.   28
Estimation of densities of voter types and thus our numerical computation is based upon four 
sets of data pooled over two adjacent election years; 1976-80, 1980-84, 1984-88, and 1988-92. The 
reason for pooling is twofold. First, having accurate density estimates for the distribution of voter 
types is very important for improving the fit of our model; a small number of samples will increase 
the bias of our non-parametric density estimates significantly. Second, by pooling samples in two ad-
jacent election years, we have relatively stable results that will not be driven by year-specific political 
issues (e.g., candidate personality), which we did not model. 
Other parameter values are estimated for each election year (Table A-4-3 in Appendix 1), but 
the average values of two years are applied to each of pooled data in numerical computation.  
In our model, voters are characterized by a trait vector  ) , ˆ ( ρ w . We define ρ to be the racism-
induced aid-to-blacks that we constructed in section 2. Because racial attitudes are not significantly 
influenced by income, we estimate the joint distribution of voter traits by estimating  ) (w f and  ) (ρ g  
separately.
6 In the estimation of densities, we apply the Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel density estimation 
                                                           
6 We do not find a significant difference of the conditional densities  ) | ( w g ρ  across income groups. 
(See Figure A-4-2 in Appendix 1.) We formally tested the independence assumption using two non-
parametric test statistics. First, we compute the Kolmogorov-Smirnov similarity statistic (see Appendix 3) 
for each pair of conditional densities to see whether they differ across income groups. (The computed KS 
statistics and p-values are presented in Table A-4-4 in Appendix 1.) Except in a few cases, we were unable 
to reject the hypothesis that a pair of two conditional densities is identical. Second, we calculate the T1 sta-
tistic suggested by Ahmad and Li (see Pagan and Ullah (1999; p.71) and Appendix 3 in this paper); we 
were again unable to reject the null hypothesis of independence against the alternative of dependence. In-
deed estimating a fully bivariate density when the correlation between the two variables is very weak does 
more harm than good, because kernel estimates of joint densities are in general inaccurate unless the sam- 29
method. (See Appendix 3 for details.) The real wage rate is the nominal representative wage rate, es-
timated from the PSID using only SRC sample with positive taxable incomes, adjusted by the Con-
sumer Price Index (1984=100).  
Figure 4-1 shows the estimated densities of ρ, while Figure A-4-1 in Appendix 1 shows the es-
timated densities of w ˆ  and ρ, together with the 95% asymptotic confidence intervals for their mar-
ginal densities; the marginal densities are quite tightly estimated. 
 
[Figure 4-1 about here] 
We also computed the observed marginal tax rates and transfer payments ( obs t  and  obs b ) by re-
gressing post-fisc family income on pre-fisc family income with a constant term. (Thus the slope coef-
ficient is (1-t) and the constant corresponds to b.)  The regression results are reported in Table 4-1.  
 
[Table 4-1 about here] 
Te linear fit is extremely good. The R
2 is higher than 0.90 in almost all years, and the regression 
with the quadratic or cubic terms does not add much explanatory power. We compared our linear fit 
with non-parametric fits based on locally weighted smoothing (lowess) with two different bandwidths 
(0.2 and 0.8); one cannot tell the difference between them except in the range where very few high 
income samples exist as outliers. (See Figure A-4-4 in Appendix 1.)  
The marginal tax rates increase until 1980, and then decline gradually. As the marginal tax rates 
decline over time, the transfer payments also decline in real terms. As the last column of Table 4-1 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
ple size is large. Silverman (1986; pp. 92-3) describes the ‘empty-space phenomenon’ where very few 
points are around the origin when the dimension is greater than 1.  30
indicates, the transfer payments calculated in real terms using the Consumer Price Index declined 
from $6609.9 in 1976 to $5295.6 in 1990. 
The parameter vector that characterizes the labor supply functions,  ) , , , ( F M F M λ λ β β  was esti-
mated using those estimates of uncompensated wage elasticities of labor supply estimated by Haus-
man (1981) and Triest (1990). (See Appendix 4 for details.) 
Once the distribution of voter types and parameter values for the sub-utility function are esti-
mated we can estimate the Laffer curve in the model. Figure 4-2 shows the estimated Laffer curves 
together with the observed policy pair  ) , ( obs obs b t  (estimated by the average value of two years). We 
also computed, by a bootstrapping method, the asymptotic confidence interval of the Laffer curve by 
considering only the estimation errors inherited from the estimation of the wage distribution.
7 
The solid line represents the Laffer curve based on our non-parametric estimation of the wage 
distribution. The fit of our model is remarkably accurate; the observed fiscal policy (the large dot) lies 
very close to the estimated Laffer curve for all periods! For the sake of comparison, we also estimated 
the Laffer curve based on the lognormal wage distribution function, two parameters of which are es-
timated from the data (the dotted curve) by minimizing the  2 L -norm of the difference between the 
lognormal density and the kernel density. Supremacy of the non-parametric estimation method is clear. 
The tax rate that maximizes the Laffer curve is about 0.71-0.74, which is very high. 
 
[Figure 4-2 about here] 
Observed vote shares ( obs ϕ ) are easy to obtain but observed racial policies (
D
obs r  and 
R
obs r ) and 
fiscal policies (
D
obs t  and 
R
obs t ) of the two parties are difficult to estimate. The NES provides informa-
                                                           
7 The bootstrap sample size is 1000. The actual confidence interval would be wider than shown here 
if we considered estimations errors inherited from parameter values.  31
tion on the public perception about the presidential candidates’ position on aid-to-blacks (see Figure 
A-2-2 in Appendix 1). Assuming that voters are perceptive, we simply took the mean values as the 
candidates’ positions on the racial issue (
D
obs r  and 
R
obs r ). The tax rates ‘announced’ by parties are rarely 
observable. We simply assume that the observed fiscal policy before the enactments of the two major 
Reagan tax reforms is the announced policy of party D, whereas the policy after the reforms is the an-
nounced policy of party R. Indeed, the fiscal system in the US was basically unchanged between the 
New Deal and the early 1980s. Thus we set  372 . 0 =
D
obs t  and  2793 . 0 =
R
obs t . 
We apply equation (35) to estimate  ) , , ( 2 0 γ δ δ . But recall that we cannot estimate all these pa-
rameters with regression techniques because of an identification problem. First, we can only estimate 








obs r r t E t E − γ − − δ , which gives a linear relationship between  2 δ  and γ. 
Second, we cannot estimate  0 δ  because it is absorbed into the constant term.  









obs r r t t ϕ = γ δ δ ϕ ) , , ; , , , ( 2 0 . (Thus we have one degree of freedom in the choice of parame-
ters.
8) The justification for this constraint is that our full model must be correctly specified at least in 
one aspect, to make our counterfactual experiments meaningful. As we have seen earlier through the 
tight fit of the Laffer curve (Figure 4-2), our model is very well specified on the economic side. 
 
5. Numerical solution of the model 
 
                                                           
8 This constraint is not tautological, because we are imposing the condition that the vote share our 
model predicts at the observed platform be equal to the observed vote share.   32
With those parameters and density functions estimated in section 4, we carry out the computa-
tion separately for 4 periods: 1976-80, 1980-84, 1984-88, and 1988-1992. Finding equilibrium values 
for all three models requires about 1000 iterations for each set of parameter values in each period. De-
tails of the computation procedure are explained in Appendix 4. 
Table 5-1 shows the results obtained by this procedure when  1 0 = δ  for all periods. The ex-
pected tax rate is the average of the tax rates of the two parties, weighted by the vote share that each 
party gets. 
[Table 5-1 about here] 
First, we remark that the equilibrium prediction in the full model is very close to the observed 
values; as well, the time series pattern is close to the historical trend reported in Table 4-1. For in-
stance, the expected tax rate at the equilibrium changes from 29.3% in 1976-80 to 34.65% in 1980-
1984, and then declines afterwards up to 28.7% in 1988-92. This is remarkable, because we only im-
posed the specification condition that the vote share predicted by our model at the observed platforms 
be equal to the observed vote share. 
Because the expected tax rate is determined by three factors – the vote share, the tax rate pro-
posed by party D, and the tax rate proposed by party R – looking only at the expected tax rate may not 
be enough. So we examined each of these factors separately. 
The equilibrium tax rates are differentiated between the two parties. The tax rate proposed by 
the Democratic Party is usually 12-16% higher than that proposed by the Republican Party. In 1984-
88, for instance, the Democratic Party proposes a marginal tax rate of 37% while the Republican Party 
proposes a tax rate of 23.9%, which is close to the observed tax rates that we postulated in section 4.   33
The equilibrium vote share of party D is also close to the historical vote share, although its 
prediction is poor in 1980-84. Our equilibrium prediction is that the vote share for the Democratic 
Party in that period is greater than 50%, although the Republican Party won that election. 
One reason for inaccuracy in some years is because the true value of  0 δ , which we are unable to 
identify, may not be equal to 1 for these years. Nevertheless, we believe that the level of prediction 
accuracy achieved by a model that controls only two dimensions of American political life is high. 
The effect of racism on redistribution in the United States is large.  We predict that the Republi-
can Party would have proposed a marginal tax rate of 40% in 1984-88, absent racism. Due to the exis-
tence of racism, however, the Republican Party was able to propose a tax rate of 23.9% in this period; 
thus the effect of racism on the tax rate is about 16.5 % in 1984-1988 for the Republican Party. The 
effect of racism on the tax rate of the Democratic Party is also large. Absent racism, we predict party 
D would have proposed a marginal tax rate of 49.9%; due to the existence of racism, it proposed 37%.  
The fact that the total effect of racism appears to be large for both parties implies that voter ra-
cism pushes both parties in the United States significantly to the right on the economic issue. Absent 
race as an issue in American politics, the fiscal policy in the USA would look quite similar to fiscal 
policies in Northern Europe. 
Although the total effect is large for both parties, the composition of the total effect differs be-
tween the two parties; see Table 5-1. In terms of the tax policy, the policy bundle effect is bigger than 
the anti-solidarity effect for the Republican Party whereas the anti-solidarity effect is bigger for the 
Democratic Party. In 1980-84, for example, for party D, 82% of the total effect of racism on the tax 
rate is attributed to the anti-solidarity effect.   34
The effect of racism on redistribution varies across time, reflecting changes in the distribution of 
voter traits. In terms of the expected tax rate, the smallest effect is in 1980-1984, where the distribu-
tion of racial views among citizens is least skewed and has the lowest mean. 
The effect of voter racism on the vote share for party D is also very large. The biggest effect oc-
curred in 1984-88 when the Democrats lost about 38% of vote share due to racism. We note that for 
some years (1980-84 and 1988-92) the anti-solidarity effect of voter racism on vote share is positive 
rather than negative. Recall that the vote shares are affected through two channels: the direct channel 
mediated through changes in parameter values and the indirect channel through changes in equilib-
rium platforms. Indeed when we compute the vote share while fixing the platform at the value ob-
tained from the full model, the two effects of voter racism on D vote share is always negative; the in-
direct effect induced by the platform change has a large influence on the vote share. 
Another way of looking at the significance of the policy bundle effect is to examine the equilib-
rium party membership. (Recall that our model determines party memberships endogenously, together 
with the equilibrium policy vectors.) In Figure 5-1, we have drawn the party membership separation 
hyper-space, together with the observed membership distribution of voter types, for three models: the 
full model and the two counterfactual models. 
 
[Figure 5-1 about here] 
Figure 5-1(a) shows that party membership is more sensitive to voters’ racial positions than to 
their economic positions. The hyper-space that separates the type space into the two parties is nega-
tively sloped in the full model but the slope is small. Figures 5-1(b) and 5-1(c) indicate that, were the 
race issue not a dimension of political competition, citizens would be partitioned into parties more 
according to their economic position rather than their racial position.  35
Alternatively phrased, our model predicts an alignment of political parties in the US primarily 
along the racial issue, in the sense that party membership is best characterized by a partition of the 
space of voter types which differentiates citizens according to their racial views, not their incomes.  If, 
somehow, the race issue were to disappear from politics, there would be realignment so that member-
ship would be defined primarily by differentiation of voters along the economic dimension.  We take 
this difference between party identification in the multi- and unidimensional policy problems to be 
quite significant. 
We next compare the equilibrium separation of citizens into the two parties, determined by the 
model, with the real party identification estimated from the actual data; Figure 5-2 shows the graph.  
 
[Figure 5-2 about here] 
Each cell in Figure 5-2 represents the type space, with the wage on the abscissa and racial view 
in the ordinate. In the graph we represent different densities of observed D party membership (i.e., the 
fraction voting D) across 25 discrete cells with different shades of gray; the darker the cell is, the 
higher the observed Democratic membership. Shown together with the density plots is the party sepa-
ration graph ) , , (
D D w τ τ Ψ = ρ , the cutoff hyper-space for party membership in the model. Since there 
are many PUNEEPs, there are as many Ψ  graphs as there are PUNEEPs. The graph of Ψ  drawn in 
Figure 5-2 is based on the (weighted) mean value of the platform vector  ) , (
R D τ τ . If reality 
conformed perfectly to the model, then each of these graphs would be all black below the curve and 
all white above the curve. Albeit imperfect, the separation of party membership by the hyper-space is 
quite close to the actual separation of party membership. 
Figure 5-2 shows the historical voter realignment more clearly than Figure 5-1. In 1976-1980 
and 1980-84, the model predicts that many poor racist voters should have voted for the Democratic  36
Party. But these voters are shown to defect from the Democrats to the Republicans gradually, and in 
1984-88, poor racist voters no longer vote Democratic. In 1988-1992, poor voters again should vote 
Democratic, but this is not because the slope of the voter separation curve has changed; the slope of 




We conclude that both the policy bundle effect and anti-solidarity effect of racism on fiscal pol-
icy are significant and negative in this period. Voter racism pushes both parties in the United States 
significantly to the right on economic issues. 
Our analysis provides a very different perspective on the importance of the race issue in Ameri-
can politics than those of Poole of Rosenthal (1997) and McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2003), who 
argue that, although race has sometimes been a significant second issue, it is of only marginal signifi-
cance. The Poole-Rosenthal-McCarty analysis, as it is not based on an equilibrium model, is unable to 
postulate counterfactual histories. Indeed Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show how radically the partition of the 
set of types into two parties would change were race to cease to be an issue. With the race issue pre-
sent, the D-R party partition is defined very sharply with respect to racial views, and much less 
sharply with respect to income class. Thus a unidimensional (economic) model of American politics 
gravely mischaracterizes the nature of political competition. 
Indeed the historical observation that the United States experienced increasing income inequal-
ity and significant tax cuts since the 1980s raises one puzzle to the well known claim of unidimen-
sional Downsian models, that the equilibrium tax rate is positively correlated with inequality. If the 
dimension of income had become more and more important in determining the voting pattern, how  37
could one explain that the equilibrium tax rates have been declining in the period of rising inequality?
9 
The current paper provides an answer to this question: the existence of a non-economic dimension, 
such as race, changes the alignment of voters in a significantly different way from that predicted by 
one dimensional models.  
Our analysis also provides a different perspective on the importance of the race issue in Ameri-
can politics than that of Alesina et al. (2001). These authors attribute the effect of racism largely to 
what we call the anti-solidarity effect, but we have shown that the policy bundle effect is non-
negligible. As we indicated in section 3.F, attributing the magnitude of the coefficient on the racism 
variable to the anti-solidarity effect significantly overestimates its importance.  
The research strategy employed in the current paper might be fruitfully employed for other 
countries. In Europe, with the exception of the UK, the influx of people of color has, in large part, 
been a phenomenon of the last forty years, via immigration from Asia, Asia Minor, and Africa. There 
have recently emerged, in several countries, politically significant movements and parties, which are 
anti-immigrant and xenophobic:  Le Pen in France is the best known, but one must also mention Aus-
tria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland.  Indeed, the phenomenon of ethnocentrism or xeno-
phobia is ‘realigning’ voters in these countries; many who used to vote Left are now voting for the 
new Right.  In particular, many unskilled white workers, who feel most threatened by immigration, 
globalization and skill biased technological change, have switched their allegiance. In future work, we 
will examine how the anti-solidarity effect and the policy bundle effect differ across countries. 
                                                           
9 This does not mean that there have been no attempts at explaining the disparity between the theo-
retical prediction of the Downsian models and the historical observation. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) show 
that beliefs in a just world may affect redistribution politics in a significant way. Piketty (1996) show how 
the perception about social mobility can affect the equilibrium outcome.    38
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Table 2-1: Determinants of whites’ racial and political attitudes (Source: NES) 
  (1)OLS (2)OLS  (3)OPROB  (4)PROB (5)PROB (6)PROB 































































































































































































































































































Observations  1905  986  1697  537 595 1234 
Covered years  all  88,92  76,84,88,92  80,84,88,92 80,84,88,92 80,84,88,92 
R-squared  0.25  0.28       
Robust t statistics for OLS and z statistics for OPROB (Ordered Probit)and PROB in paren-
theses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Year dummies and constant are controlled but not reported here.  41





Year Source  b  (1-t)  R



































































































Note: (1) The estimation is based on the following linear regression: 
) income   fisc - Pre )( 1 ( income)   fisc - Post ( t b − + = . 
(2) Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 42
Table 5-1: PUNEEPs and the decomposition of racism effect ( 1 0 = δ ) 
 




effect  PB   AS   PB (%)  AS (%) 
αD  (mode)  0.5421             
αR  (mode)  0.1940             
tD 0.3473  0.3791  0.4824  0.1351 0.0318 0.1033 23.54%  76.46% 
tR 0.2212  0.3432  0.4450  0.2238 0.1220 0.1018 54.51%  45.49% 
RD  2.7663             
RR  4.1144             
Exp tax rate  0.2927 0.3696  0.4742  0.1815  0.0769 0.1046 42.36%  57.64% 
Vote share  0.5166  0.7351  0.7814  0.2648 0.2185 0.0463 82.52%  17.48% 
# of PUNEEP  9  45  26           
 




effect  PB   AS   PB (%)  AS (%) 
αD  (mode)  0.5932             
αR  (mode)  0.2214             
tD 0.4025  0.4137  0.4666  0.0641 0.0112 0.0529 17.47%  82.53% 
tR 0.2129  0.3638  0.4391  0.2262 0.1509 0.0753 66.71%  33.29% 
RD  3.4307             
RR  3.7914             
Exp tax rate  0.3465 0.4011  0.4567  0.1102  0.0546 0.0557 49.48%  50.52% 
Vote share  0.5609  0.7466  0.6417  0.0808 0.1857  -0.1049  229.83% -129.83% 
# of PUNEEP  11  42  19           
 




effect  PB   AS   PB (%)  AS (%) 
αD  (mode)  0.5545             
αR  (mode)  0.4909             
tD 0.3709  0.3859  0.4993  0.1284 0.0150 0.1134 11.68%  88.32% 
tR 0.2392  0.3234  0.4042  0.1650 0.0842 0.0808 51.03%  48.97% 
RD  2.7771             
RR  3.6483             
Exp tax rate  0.3109 0.3659  0.4699  0.1590  0.0550 0.1040 34.61%  65.39% 
Vote share  0.4049  0.6804  0.7906  0.3857 0.2755 0.1102 71.43%  28.57% 
# of PUNEEP  23  52  15           
 




effect  PB   AS   PB (%)  AS (%) 
αD  (mode)  0.5529             
αR  (mode)  0.0705             
tD 0.3154  0.3320  0.4409  0.1255 0.0166 0.1089 13.23%  86.77% 
tR 0.1504  0.3004  0.4030  0.2526 0.1500 0.1026 59.38%  40.62% 
RD  2.8738             
RR  4.1953             
Exp tax rate  0.2870 0.3241  0.4270  0.1400  0.0371 0.1028 26.53%  73.47% 
Vote share  0.5797  0.7508  0.6320  0.0523 0.1711  -0.1188  327.15% -227.15% 
# of PUNEEP  15  36  11           
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Figure 2-1: Changes in the predicted R vote share with respect to changes in 4 core ideolo-
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Note: (1) Graphs are based on the estimated coefficients reported in column (6) of Table 2-1. We 
fixed all other variables at their mean values.  
      (2) Thin dotted lines around the thick solid lines are upper and lower bounds of 95% as-
ymptotic confidence intervals. The asymptotic standard errors of the predicted R vote shares are 
computed using a delta method (see Greene, W., 2000, Econometric Analysis, 4
th edition, New 
York, NY: Prentice Hall, p. 824).  44
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Figure 4-2: The estimated transfer function (Laffer curve), the function b(t) 
 
1976-80 1980-84 







































Note: (1) The solid line represents the estimated Laffer curve when the wage distribution is esti-
mated non-parametrically. The dotted line represents the estimated Laffer curve when the wage 
distribution is assumed to be lognormal and its two parameters are estimated by minimizing the 
2 L -norm of the difference between the lognormal density and the kernel density.  
(2) The big black dot in the graph represents  ) , ( obs obs b t  estimated from the data in section 4. (See 
Table A-4-3 in Appendix 1.) 
(3) The precise values of  obs b  and  ) ( obs t b , and tmax for other years are as follows: 
  76-80 80-84 84-88 88-92 
bobs  6582.45 6181.35 5685.75 5402.70 
b(tobs)  6815.52 6353.38 5860.17 5459.48 
tmax  0.745 0.732 0.714 0.711  46
Figure 5-1: Equilibrium Party membership at PUNEEPs: 1984-1988 
 
(a) Full model 
 
(b) Model with  r r =   (c) Model with  r r =  and  min ρ = ρ  
   
 
 
Note: (1) Voter separation hyperplanes are drawn at the mean value of equilibrium policy vectors. 
(2) Parameter values for these graphs are: 3559 . 0   , 1508 . 0   , 1 2 0 = γ = δ = δ .  47
Figure 5-2: Equilibrium and observed party membership 
 
1976-1980 1980-1984 










   
1984-1988 1988-1992 
   
 
Note: (1) Parameter values for these graphs are: 
  76-80 80-84 84-88 88-92 
0 δ   1 1 1 1 
2 δ   0.0640 0.0955 0.1508 0.0787 
γ  0.1584 0.2999 0.3559 0.1632 
(2) Shades of gray represent the density plot of observed D party membership computed from ac-
tual data; the darker the cell is, the higher the observed membership. 
(3) The downward sloping curves represent the equilibrium party separation graph in the model. 1
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Appendix 1: Other tables and figures 
 
Table A-2-1: Voting fractions in the United States (Source: NES) 
A. Entire population (Whites and Blacks) 
 
  Fraction voting for  Net change from 1960-1964 
  Period D  R  Third  Total  D  R  Third 
           
1960-64 60.48  39.11 0.4 100     
1968-72 37.24  57.83 4.92 100 -23.24 18.72  4.52
1980-88 43.78  53.06 3.17 100 -16.7 13.95  2.77
All  1992-96 47.9  37.85 14.26 100 -12.58 -1.26  13.86
           
1960-64 57.86  41.7 0.44 100     
1968-72 32.22  62.51 5.27 100 -25.64 20.81  4.83
1980-88 38.19  58.4 3.41 100 -19.67 16.7  2.97
Whites  1992-96 42.68  41.6 15.72 100 -15.18 -0.1  15.28
           
1960-64 93.06  6.94 0 100     
1968-72 89.09  10 0.91 100 -3.97 3.06  0.91
1980-88 91.16  7.18 1.66 100 -1.9 0.24  1.66
Blacks  1992-96 91.72  4.46 3.82 100 -1.34 -2.48  3.82
 
B. Whites only 
    Fraction voting for  Net change from 1960-1964 
  Period  D R Third  Total  D  R  Third 
1960-64 61.76  37.83 0.41 100     
1968-72 33.43  60.39 6.19 100 -28.33 22.56  5.78
1980-88 42.32  54.63 3.05 100 -19.44 16.8  2.64 Non-rich 
Whites  1992-96 47.85  38.8 13.34 100 -13.91 0.97  12.93
1960-64 52.97  46.53 0.5 100     
1968-72 30.11  65.84 4.04 100 -22.86 19.31  3.54
1980-88 32.26  64.02 3.72 100 -20.71 17.49  3.22 Rich  
Whites  1992-96 35.34  44.4 20.26 100 -17.63 -2.13  19.76
1960-64 59.7  39.8 0.49 100     
1968-72 32.52  61.7 5.78 100 -27.18 21.9  5.29
1980-88 38.36  58.88 2.76 100 -21.34 19.08  2.27 Uneducated 
Whites  1992-96 45.3  37.44 17.26 100 -14.4 -2.36  16.77
1960-64 42.31  57.69 0 100     
1968-72 30.92  66.18 2.9 100 -11.39 8.49 2.9
1980-88 37.62  57.04 5.34 100 -4.69 -0.65  5.34 Educated 
Whites  1992-96 38.52  48.98 12.5 100 -3.79 -8.71  12.5 3
Table A-2-2: Varimax-rotated factor loadings: Whites only (Source: NES) 
 
 
1976 (obs.=497)          
Variable 1 2 3 4  Uniqueness
 feminism  compassion  libertarianism  racism   
Antiblack affect  0.01822 -0.07963 -0.07387 0.82937  0.30001
Civil rights push too fast  -0.20691 0.0181 0.19432 0.69206  0.44015
Poor thermometer  -0.05059 0.74197 0.12747 0.01666 0.43039
Welfare thermometer  0.07812 0.77161 -0.08294 -0.19544 0.35343
Union thermometer  0.06135 0.58147 -0.40796 0.18032 0.45918
Strong government  0.08319 -0.05828 0.7398 0.07416 0.43688
Trust government  0.07357 -0.01298 -0.70663 0.00232 0.49509
Women equal  -0.80756 0.25927 0.0293 0.08598 0.27238
Women liberty thermometer  0.81714 0.24631 0.05921 0.02117 0.26766
Political Ideology  -0.54612 -0.19377 0.10397 0.22827  0.60128
          
Eigenvalues 2.03891 1.59067 1.1905 1.12346   
Difference 0.44824 0.40017 0.06704 0.23372   
Proportion 0.2039 0.1591 0.1191 0.1123   
Cumulative 0.2039 0.363 0.482 0.5944   
          
          
1992 (obs.=608)          
Variable 1 2 3 4  Uniqueness
 feminism  compassion 
anti-
libertarianism   racism   
Antiblack affect  0.03785 -0.06921 0.01671 0.86212  0.25024
Civil rights push too fast  -0.37889 0.02574 -0.07252 0.62184  0.46384
Poor thermometer  -0.02324 0.7910 -0.05156 0.05249 0.36837
Welfare thermometer  0.09675 0.7356 -0.02186 -0.31366 0.35067
Union thermometer  0.13894 0.68017 0.20075 0.10673 0.46637
Strong government  -0.23476 -0.19503 -0.67365 0.04696 0.45084
Trust government  -0.06428 -0.05826 0.85737 0.01266 0.25723
Women equal  -0.80464 0.08237 0.01048 -0.08149 0.33902
Women liberty thermometer  0.63397 0.42618 0.10187 -0.13395 0.38814
Political Ideology  -0.71939 -0.13268 -0.03531 0.18314  0.43009
          
Eigenvalue 2.57095 1.39317 1.21693 1.05412   
Difference 1.17777 0.17624 0.16281 0.30858   
Proportion 0.2571 0.1393 0.1217 0.1054   
Cumulative 0.2571 0.3964 0.5181 0.6235   
  4
Table A-2-3 (1): Determinants of whites’ racial attitudes (Source: NES) 
 
  (1)OLS (2)OLS  (3)OLS (4)OLS (5)OLS (6)OPROB 














































































































































































































































































































Observations  1905  989  989 986 986 1697 
Covered  years  all  88,92  88,92 88,92 88,92 76,84,88,92
R-squared  0.25 0.20  0.30 0.28 0.26  
Robust t statistics for OLS and z statistics for OPROB (Ordered Probit) in parenthe-
ses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Year dummies and constant are controlled but not reported here  5
Table A-2-3 (2): Determinants of whites’ attitude on political parties (Source: NES) 
 
 







































































































































































































































Observations  1527 1527 537  595  1234 
Covered years  80,84,88,92 80,84,88,92 80,84,88,92 80,84,88,92 80,84,88,92 
R-squared  0.17 0.22      
Robust t statistics for OLS and z statistics for Probit in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Year dummies and constant are controlled but not reported here.  6
Table A-2-4: Determinants of whites’ attitude on various social issues (Source: NES) 
 
  (1)OLS  (2)OLS  (3)OPROB (4)OPROB (5)OPROB (6)OPROB 













































































































































































































































































































Observations 1156  1541  1193 1225 1222 1216 
Covered years  84,88,92  76,84,88,9
2 
84,88,92 84,88,92 84,88,92 84,88,92 
R-squared  0.19  0.17      
Robust t statistics for OLS and z statistics for OPROB (Ordered Probit) in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Year dummies and constant are controlled but not reported here 
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Table A-2-4 Continued 
 (7)OLS  (8)OLS  (9)OLS  (10)OPROB  (11)PROBIT  (12)PROBIT 






































































































































































































































































































Observations 1863  1232  2010  2005  463  1000 
Covered years  all  84,88,92  all  all  76  76,92 
R-squared 0.16  0.22  0.90       
Robust t statistics for OLS and z statistics for OPROB (Ordered Probit) in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Year dummies and constant are controlled but not reported here 
  8
Table A-2-4 Continued 
 
 (13)OLS  (14)OLS  (15)OLS  (16)OPROB  (17)OLS 






















































































































































































































































Observations 1473  916  951  543  1511 
Covered years  80,84,88,92  76,92  80,84,88  80,84  80,84,88,92 
R-squared 0.26 0.20  0.23   0.20 
Robust t statistics for OLS and z statistics for OPROB (Ordered Probit) in parenthe-
ses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Year dummies and constant are controlled but not reported here 
  9
Table A-4-1: CPI indices and OASDI tax rate table used in the paper 
 
OASDI and HI tax rate table 
OASDI HI 
 CPI  multiplier  employeesself-employedtaxable maximumemployees self-employed
1971  40.5  2.565432 0.0460 0.0690 $7,800 0.0060  0.0060
1972  41.8  2.485646 0.0460 0.0690 $9,000 0.0060  0.0060
1975  53.8  1.931227 0.0495 0.0700 $14,100 0.0090  0.0090
1976  56.9  1.826011 0.0495 0.0700 $15,300 0.0090  0.0090
1979  72.6  1.431129 0.0508 0.0705 $22,900 0.0105  0.0105
1980  82.4  1.260922 0.0508 0.0705 $25,900 0.0105  0.0105
1983  99.6  1.043173 0.0540 0.0805 $35,700 0.0130  0.0130
1984  103.9  1 0.0570 0.1140 $37,800 0.0130  0.0260
1987  113.6  0.914613 0.0570 0.1140 $43,800 0.0145  0.0290
1988  118.3  0.878276 0.0606 0.1212 $45,000 0.0145  0.0290
1990  130.7  0.79495 0.0620 0.1240 $51,300 0.0145  0.0290
 
Source: (1) CPI indices are taken from Table B-60 in the Economic Report of the President 
(2001). 
(2) OASDI and HI tax rates are taken from the tax rate table posted in the official web site of the 
Social Security Administration (URL: http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA).   10
Table A-4-2: Comparison of percentile incomes (nominal) in the NES and the PSID 
 
 
Year    16 pctile  33 pctile  67 pctile  95 pctile  97 pctile 
1976 W-NES  3999 7999  14999 34999   
 W-PSID (3077)  3500 8500  17800 36530   
 w-PSID (2473)  2.28 4.10  7.09  13.78  37.54 
1980 W-NES  6999 11999 24999 49999   
 W-PSID (3268)  5296 11828 25230 53000   
 w-PSID (2662)  3.23 5.60  10.20 19.30  53.63 
1984 W-NES  6999 12999 29999 59999   
 W-PSID (3405)  7763 15500 33500 71000   
 w-PSID (2704)  3.39 6.65  12.50 24.50  64.35 
1988 W-NES  9999 14999 34999 89999   
 W-PSID (3479)  8386 19000 41146 90768   
 w-PSID (2781)  3.92 7.35  14.70 31.28  96.53 
1992 W-NES  9999 19999 39999 89999   
 W-PSID (3518)  8000 19685 45000 99010   
 w-PSID (2790)  3.87 7.83  15.31 33.28  96.53 
 
Note: The statistics in 1992 for the PSID is based on 1990 data (using the 1991 PSID).  11
Table A-4-3: Estimated parameter values of the model (Summary) 
 
 1976 1980 1984 1988  1992  Source 
cpi multiplier (1984==1)  1.826 1.2609 1 0.8783  0.7949  ERP 
wM: male hourly wage (nominal $)  6.18 8.65 10.75 12.79  13.46  PSID 
wF: female hourly wage (nominal $)  2.72 3.95 5.26 6.78  7.77  PSID 
LM: male annual working hours 1951.2 1919.8 1925.7 1973.6  1974.5  PSID 
LF: female annual working hours   850.3 966.0 1101.0 1176.9  1208.1  PSID 
YM: male labor income (nominal $)  12790.2 17790.8 23049.4 27769.6  30099.3  PSID 
YF: female labor income (nominal $)  3563.7 5542.5 8160.6 11009.1  12703.3  PSID 
O: Other family income (nominal $)  1504.3 2124.0 3557.6 4381.5  4331.9  PSID 
W: Pre-fisc family income (nominal $) 14978.0 21217.7 29085.3 36310.3  39320.5  PSID 
X: Post-fisc family income (nominal $) 13361.7 11357.3 25574.0 32385.9  35000.9  PSID 
Gini: Pre-fisc family income (nominal)  0.4211 0.4206 0.4351 0.4489  0.4627  PSID 
Gini: Post-fisc family income (nominal) 0.3273 0.3237 0.3471 0.3633  0.3734  PSID 
Theil: Pre-fisc family income (nominal)  0.3097 0.3034 0.3435 0.3654  0.3878  PSID 
Theil: Post-fisc family income (nominal)  0.1792 0.1734 0.2155 0.2401  0.2534  PSID 
k1=wF/wM 0.4397 0.4562 0.4889 0.5301  0.5772  PSID 
k3=O/W 0.1004 0.1001 0.1223 0.1207  0.1238  PSID 
uncompensated elasticity (male)  0.03 0.05     HT 
uncompensated elasticity (female)  0.99 0.97     HT 
tobs: observed tax rate  0.3496 0.3722 0.3204 0.2808  0.2793  PSID 
bobs: observed per capita transfer (real 
$) 6609.9 6555.0 5807.7 5509.8  5295.6  PSID 
C: per capita public good (nominal $)  1616.3 2697.8 3511.3 3924.4  4319.6  PSID 
tDobs 0.3496 0.3496 0.3496 0.3496  0.3496  PSID 
tRobs 0.2793 0.2793 0.2793 0.2793  0.2793  PSID 
bDobs (real $)  6609.9 6609.9 6609.9 6609.9  6609.9  PSID 
bRobs (real $)  5295.6 5295.6 5295.6 5295.6  5295.6  PSID 
RDobs 3.1751 3.1322 3.1683 3.3604  3.3087  NES 
RRobs 3.9209 4.9712 4.5281 4.7850  4.9128  NES 
white population ratio  0.880 0.879 0.877 0.874  0.870  SAUS 
observed D vote share  0.511 0.447 0.408 0.461  0.535  SAUS 
self-reported D vote share  0.49 0.43 0.43 0.49  0.57  NES 
observed R vote share  0.489 0.553 0.592 0.539  0.465  SAUS 
 
 
Note: (1) PSID= Panel Study of Income Dynamics; NES=National Election Studies; 
ERP=Economic Report of the President; SAUS= Statistical Abstracts of the United States; HT= 
Hausman (1981) and Triest(1990) 
(2) Parameter values for 1992 estimated from the PSID are based on the 1991 PSID.  12
Table A-4-4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic and p-value for evaluating similarities of 
) | ( w g ρ  across 5 income groups in the NES 
 
1976-1980 
 2  3  4 5
1 0.1175  0.1669 0.1798 0.1498
 0.649  0.115  0.076 0.426
2   0.1186  0.1396 0.1562
   0.235  0.107 0.236
3     0.0633 0.0674
     0.662 0.882
4       0.1005
       0.597
1980-1984 
 2  3  4 5
1 0.1196  0.0864 0.1396 0.1718
 0.747  0.855  0.317 0.439
2   0.0971  0.0793 0.1436
   0.748  0.931 0.672
3     0.0826 0.1475
     0.549 0.489
4       0.1876
       0.186
1984-1988 
 2  3  4 5
1 0.1163  0.1338 0.1042 0.1631
 0.687  0.244  0.554 0.573
2   0.0614  0.1184 0.2158
   0.981  0.396 0.236
3     0.1177 0.2308
     0.061 0.089
4       0.1305
       0.705
1988-1992 
 2  3  4 5
1 0.1882  0.1155 0.0882 0.2012
 0.638  0.226  0.541 0.084
2   0.0993  0.1851 0.2743
   0.343  0.004 0.004
3     0.1258 0.2141
     0.006 0.016
4       0.1389
       0.256
 
Note: The numbers in the first cell are Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic whereas the numbers in the 
second cell are p-values. 13





















































































































































































Observations  623 450 585 785 
Absolute values of z statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Year dummies and constant are controlled but not reported here 
  14
Table A-4-5 (2): R vote share weighted probit regression; the variable past-economy is con-
trolled (Source: NES) 
 























































































































































































Observations  623 448 580 781 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Year dummies and constant are controlled but not reported here.  15
Table A-5-1: PUNEEPs and the decomposition of racism effect ( 9 . 0 0 = δ ) 
 
 




effect  PB   AS   PB (%)  AS (%) 
bpower of D (mode)  0.6042               
bpower of R (mode)  0.2493               
tD 0.3371  0.3619  0.4716  0.1345 0.0248 0.1097  18.44%  81.56% 
tR 0.2027  0.3321  0.4157  0.2130 0.1294 0.0836  60.75%  39.25% 
RD  3.2162             
RR  4.2044             
Exp tax rate  0.2872 0.3537  0.4605 0.1733  0.0665  0.1068 38.37% 61.63% 
Vote share  0.4966  0.7251  0.8017  0.3051 0.2285 0.0766 74.89% 25.11% 
# of PUNEEP  6  30  15           
 




effect  PB   AS   PB (%)  AS (%) 
bpower of D (mode)  0.5026               
bpower of R (mode)  0.2742               
tD 0.3985  0.4072  0.4433  0.0448 0.0087 0.0361  19.42%  80.58% 
tR 0.2094  0.3638  0.4109  0.2015 0.1544 0.0471  76.63%  23.37% 
RD  3.1437             
RR  3.9426             
Exp tax rate  0.3301 0.3920  0.4336 0.1035  0.0619  0.0417 59.75% 40.25% 
Vote share  0.5204  0.6487  0.7013  0.1809 0.1283 0.0526 70.92% 29.08% 
# of PUNEEP  13  43  18           
 




effect  PB   AS   PB (%)  AS (%) 
bpower of D (mode)  0.4993               
bpower of R (mode)  0.3204               
tD 0.3573  0.3801  0.4731  0.1158 0.0228 0.0930  19.69%  80.31% 
tR 0.2309  0.2842  0.3824  0.1515 0.0533 0.0982  35.18%  64.82% 
RD  2.9184             
RR  3.8346             
Exp tax rate  0.3072 0.3504  0.4550 0.1478  0.0432  0.1046 29.23% 70.77% 
Vote share  0.4496  0.6903  0.8002  0.3506 0.2407 0.1099 68.65% 31.35% 
# of PUNEEP  18  48  13           
 




effect  PB   AS   PB (%)  AS (%) 
bpower of D (mode)  0.6393               
bpower of R (mode)  0.1759               
tD 0.3044  0.3237  0.4097  0.1053 0.0193 0.0860  18.33%  81.67% 
tR 0.1642  0.2987  0.3999  0.2357 0.1345 0.1012  57.06%  42.94% 
RD  2.9781             
RR  4.0335             
Exp tax rate  0.2642 0.3162  0.4067 0.1425  0.0520  0.0905 36.52% 63.48% 
Vote share  0.5476  0.7012  0.6924  0.1448 0.1536  -0.0088  106.08%  -6.08% 
# of PUNEEP  12  30  13            16
Figure A-2-1: Voter realignment since 1952 (Source: NES) 
 
 











Southern Whites 83.13 71.43 70.97 66.67 56.17 52.9 53.3 52.04 46.83 49.1 43.73 48.48
Non-southern Whites 51.26 44.17 48.99 56.75 48.4 47.6 44.09 46.81 45.58 41.46 45.97 47.24
Blacks 61.54 57.32 55.77 86.08 89.33 72.66 89.47 79.38 78.4 80.47 75.3 81.31
1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996
 











Southern Whites 47.5 54.37 51.65 59.77 22.11 22.86 49.18 36.21 37.93 40 38.13 43.92
Non-southern Whites 39.33 35.93 46.65 67.8 37.73 32.53 43.01 30.67 37.29 45.06 41.84 45.43
Blacks 77.78 65.52 80 100 97.37 84.72 91.3 98.15 89.39 86.89 90.53 93.55
1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996
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Figure A-2-2: Mean ratings of position on the racial issue: Voter’s racism-induced position 


























D candidate 2.646986 3.17507 3.132216 3.168258 3.36043 3.308692 3.256954
Voters 4.170318 4.233192 3.884771 4.323333 4.42179
R candidate 4.135945 3.920912 4.971193 4.52809 4.784978 4.912797 5.040616














Note: (1) Voters’ racial policy position is computed by the mean score of racism-induced aid-to-
blacks. 
(2) Candidate positions are computed by the mean scores of aid-to-blacks of candidates perceived 
by voters.   18
Figure A-4-1: Kernel density estimates of voter types and their 95% asymptotic confidence 
intervals: 1976-1980 and 1988-92, Whites only 
 
Density of real representative wage rates: 
1976-1980 (Source: PSID) 
Density of real representative wage rates: 1988-
1992 (Source: PSID) 
















Density of racism-induced aid-to-blacks scores: 
1976-80 (Source: NES) 
Density of racism-induced aid-to-blacks scores: 
1988-92 (Source: NES) 


















Note: (1) Thick solid lines are density estimates, and thin dotted lines are upper and lower bounds 
of 95% confidence intervals. (See Appendix 3.) 
(2) Kernel=Gaussian, bandwidth= ]
349 . 1
, [ * 9 . 0
5 / 1 IQR
Var Min n h
− = , where n is the number of sam-
ples, Var is the variance, and IQR is the inter-quartile range.   19

















































































































































































































Note: We have drawn the joint densities for blacks and whites separately.  21
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Figure A-5-1: PUNEEPs’ in 1984-1988 
 
1976-80 1984-88 
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Appendix 2: Variables from the National Election Studies 
Variable Name  Definition and Coding 
Abortion law  There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the 
opinions on this page best agrees with your view? 
1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.                  
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is 
in danger.  
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the 
woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.   
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal 
choice.    
Aid to blacks  Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to 
improve the social and economic position of blacks (1970: Negroes) and other minority 
groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minori-
ties because they should help themselves. 
1.Government should help minority groups/blacks               
2…6                                                             
7. Minority groups/blacks should help themselves 
Bible authority  Here are four statements about the Bible and I’d like you to tell me which is closest to your 
own view. 
1. The Bible is God’s word and all it says is true                 
2. The Bible was written by men inspired by God but it contains  some human errors.            
3. The Bible is a good book because it was written by wise men, but God had nothing to 
do with it.                          
4. The Bible was written by men who lived so long ago that it is worth very little today. 
Black deserve  Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve. 
1. agree strongly; 2. agree somewhat; 3. neither agree nor disagree; 4. disagree somewhat; 
5. disagree strongly                            
Black difficult  Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for 
blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 
1. agree strongly; 2. agree somewhat; 3. neither agree nor disagree; 4. disagree somewhat; 
5. disagree strongly 
Black effort  It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder 
they could be just as well off as whites. 
1. agree strongly; 2. agree somewhat; 3. neither agree nor disagree; 4. disagree somewhat; 
5. disagree strongly                            
Black favor  Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way 
up.  Blacks should to the same without any special favors. 
1. agree strongly; 2. agree somewhat; 3. neither agree nor disagree; 4. disagree somewhat; 
5. disagree strongly   
Civil rights too 
fast 
Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they 
haven’t pushed fast enough.  




We would like to get your feelings towards some of these groups (Blacks, Whites, Poor 
People, Women’s Liberation, Labor Union)… We call it a “feeling thermometer” because 
it measures your feelings towards groups. … If you don’t know too much about a group or 
don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward them, then you should place them in the mid-
dle, at the 50 degree mark.  If you have a warm feeling toward a group or feel favorably 
toward it, you would give it a score somewhere between 50 degrees and 100 degrees, de-
pending on how warm your feeling is toward the group. On the other hand, if you don’t 
feel very favorably toward some of these groups—if there are some you don’t care for too 
much—then you would place them somewhere between 0 degrees and 50 degrees. 
Govt spending  Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as 
health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it is important for 
the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. 
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?  24
1. Government should provide many fewer services: reduce spending a lot 
2…6 
7. Government should provide many more services: increase spending a lot 
Govt defense 
spending 
Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that 
defense spending should be greatly increased. Where would you place yourself on this 
scale or haven’t you thought  much about this? 
1. Greatly decrease defense spending 
2…6 
7. Greatly increase defense spending.   
Govt environ-
mental spending 
Should federal spending on <item> be increased, decreased or kept about the same? 
1. increased; 2. same; 3. decreased or cut out entirely 
Govt food stamp 
spending 
Should federal spending on <item> be increased, decreased or kept about the same?    
1. increased; 2. same; 3. decreased or cut out entirely 
Govt health in-
surance 
There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs.  Some feel there 
should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital ex-
penses. Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by individuals, and through pri-
vate insurance. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought 
much about this?   
1.  Government insurance plan 
2…6 
7. Private insurance plan 
Govt public 
school spending 
Should federal spending on <item> be increased, decreased or kept about the same? 
1. increased; 2. same; 3. decreased or cut out entirely  
Govt social secu-
rity spending 
Should federal spending on <item> be increased, decreased or kept about the same? 
1. increased; 2. same; 3. decreased or cut out entirely 
Helpful  Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves?   
1. Just look out for themselves; 2. Try to be helpful   
Job guarantee  Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has 
a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each per-
son get ahead on his/their own. And, of course, some other people have    opinions some-
where in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought 
much about this?   
1. Government see to job and good standard of living 
2…6 
7. Government let each person get ahead on his own 
Less equality  The country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. 
1. agree strongly; 2. agree somewhat; 3. neither agree nor disagree; 4. disagree somewhat; 
5. disagree strongly                               
Party of Presi-
dential vote 






We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on 
which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?  
1. Extremely liberal; 2. Liberal; 3. Slightly liberal; 
4. Moderate 
5. Slightly conservative; 6. Conservative; 7. Extremely conservative 
Political party 
affect 
This is the number of Democratic (Republican) party 'likes' minus the number of    De-
mocratic (Republican) party 'dislikes'  (VCF0314-VCF0315).                        
 -5  Maximum negative                                               
 ….                                                            
+5  Maximum positive 
School prayer  Some people think it is all right for the public schools to start each day with a prayer. Oth-
ers feel that religion does not belong in the public schools but should be taken care of by 
the family and the church. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over 
other? (IF YES) Which do you think--schools should be allowed to start each day with a 
prayer or religion does not belong in the schools?  25
1.  SCHOOLS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO START WITH PRAYER             
3.  OTHER; DEPENDS; BOTH (1964-1968); DK; no interest;             
5.  RELIGION DOES NOT BELONG IN THE SCHOOL                     
Strong govt  Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good 
of the country and the individual person. Others feel that the government in Washington is 
not getting too strong. Do you have an opinion on this or not? 
1.Opinion: the government has not gotten too strong                     
2. DK; depends; other; pro-con; no interest; no opinion 
3. Opinion: the government is getting too powerful   
Take advantage  Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or 
would they try to be fair?  
0. Would try to be fair; 1. Would take advantage 
Trust govt  People have different ideas about the government in Washington. These ideas don't refer to   
Democrats or Republicans in particular, but just to government in general.  We want to see 
how you feel about these ideas. How much of the time do you think you can trust the gov-
ernment in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time or only 
some of the time?                                              
1. None of the time; 2. Some of the time; 3.  Most of the time; 4.  Just about always 
Urban unrest  There is much discussion about the best way to deal with the problem of urban unrest and 
rioting.  Some say it is more important to use all available force to maintain law and order 
-- no matter what results.  Others say it is more important to correct the problems of pov-
erty and unemployment that give rise to the disturbances. Where would you place yourself 
on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
1. Solve problems of poverty and unemployment 
2…6 
7. Use all available force 
Waste tax money  Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste 
some of it, or don't waste very much of it? 
1. a lot; 2. some; 3. not very much 
Women equal 
role 
Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights.  Some people feel that women 
should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others 
feel that a women's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale or 
haven't you thought much about this? 
1. Women and men should have an equal role                           
2…6                                                                     
7.  Women's place is in the home    
 
AGE: Age of respondents (VCF 0101) 
COHORTS: To see the cohort effect, we construct cohort dummies from AGE. Our baseline cohort is the civil rights 
movement cohort, i.e., people born in 1935-1947. 
             PRE-CRM-COHORT: pre-civil rights movement cohort (1 for people born before 1935; 0 otherwise)  
             POST-CRM-COHORT: post-civil rights movement cohort (1 for people born after 1948; 0 otherwise) 
EDUCATION: 1 = Grade school or less (0-8 grades); 2 = High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college training 
if applicable); 3 = Some College (13 grades or more but no degree); 4 = College or advanced degree 
FEMALE: 1=female; 0=male 
INCOME: Only income brackets are provided in the NES. We chose a mid-point in each income bracket and con-
verted it to the unit of $10,000. 
MARRIED: Respondent’s marital status: 1= married; 0= otherwise 
MOBILITY: There are two questions asking about how people are getting along financially these days. One ques-
tion asks whether the respondent is better off than (1), the same as (2), or the worse off than (3) he/she was a year ago 
(PERSONAL FINANCIAL SITUATION IN PAST YR). The other question asks PERSONAL FINANCIAL 
SITUATION IN NEXT YR. From these two questions, we constructed two dummy variables measuring upward mo-
bility and downward mobility. 
UPMOBILE=1 if the respondent is financially better off now than in last year and his/her personal financial 
situation is expected to be better next year; 0 otherwise 
DOWNMOBILE=1 if the respondent is financially worse off now than in last year and his/her personal fi-
nancial situation is expected to be worse next year; 0 otherwise  26
PROTESTANTISM: 2= protestant and attend church more than twice in a month; 1=protestant but attend church 
not regularly (less than twice in a month); 0=otherwise  
PASTECONOMY: Would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the 
same or gotten worse? 1.  Better; 3.  Stayed same; 5.  Worse                  
REGION: 1. Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT); 2. North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, 
NE, ND, OH, SD, WI); 3. South (AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV); 4.  
West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY)  
UNEMPLOYED: Unemployment dummy constructed from VCF0116 (Respondent’s WORK STATUS) 
1= temporarily laid off or unemployed; 2= otherwise 
UNIONMEM:  Union membership dummy constructed from VCF0127 (HOUSEHOLD UNION MEMBERSHIP) 
1= someone in household belongs to a labor union; 2 = no one in household belongs to a labor union 
URBANISM: This variable represents respondent's sampling address. 1=central cities 2=suburban area; 3=rural ar-
eas and small towns 27
Appendix 3: Kernel density estimator and asymptotic statistics 
 
(1) The kernel density estimate for variable x with a sample } { i x , which is independently and 
identically drawn from an unknown density f, is given by 


















x f  
where  i x  is the i
th sample point for variable x,  x N  is the number of observations for variable x,  x h  
is a bandwidth (or a smoothing parameter), and K(.) is a kernel function. 
The kernel estimator clearly depends on the choice of a kernel and a bandwidth, but it is 
well known that the choice of a kernel is a minor issue. Indeed the difference between the values 
of the Mean Integrated Square Error attained by most kernels and the optimal kernel, often called 
the Bartlett-Epanechnikov kernel, is small (Silverman, 1986: p. 43). We chose the Gaussian ker-
nel. 
In contrast, the selection of a bandwidth is crucial. Several methods for estimating an opti-
mal bandwidth have been suggested in the literature (e.g., cross-validation methods, plug-in 
methods), but these methods are computationally expensive and the rate of convergence is ex-
tremely slow, being of the order of 
10 / 1 −
x N . Also when the criterion function used in estimating 
the optimal bandwidth has several local minima, quite different values of estimated bandwidths 
may be derived for data sets coming from the same distribution. Therefore, in setting the optimal 
bandwidth, we follow Silverman’s rule of thumb: 
]
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where N is the number of samples, Var is the variance, and IQR is the inter-quartile range.  
One minor issue is that the above estimates are based on the assumption that the support of 
the density is the entire real line. This assumption may generate a somewhat inaccurate estimate if 
the support is bounded. We find that the estimate of the wage distribution is somewhat inaccurate 
around the origin because there are many non-working individuals. So we adjust the density esti-
mate by using the reflection method described in Silverman (1986: p.30). More precisely, we es-
timate the wage density by the formula: 
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(2) The bias of the kernel estimator is:  28
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(See Pagan and Ullah (1998, p. 22).) 
It is well known that under some regularity conditions, the kernel estimator is asymptoti-
cally unbiased ( f f E = ˆ lim ), consistent weakly ( f f
p  →  ˆ ) and strongly ( f f
s a  → 
. ˆ ), and asymp-
totically normal ( ) ) ( , 0 ( ) ˆ (
2 ψ ψ →  − ∫ d K f Normal f f h N
d
x x ). Hence a pointwise 95% confi-
dence interval for the density estimate is: 
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By replacing f with its consistent estimator (i.e,  f ˆ ) and computing  ψ ψ ∫ d K ) (
2  (which is ap-
proximately 0.2821 if the kernel is Gaussian), we obtain the asymptotic confidence interval for  f ˆ . 
(3) The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is intended to evaluate the goodness of fit of two em-
pirical distribution functions in terms of the sup norm. Suppose  ) ( ˆ
1 x FN  and  ) ( ˆ
2 x FN  are the em-
pirical distribution functions of two (independent) samples  ) ,..., (
1 1 N X X  and  ) ,..., (
2 1 N Y Y . The KS 
statistic is ) ( ) ( sup
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N N z i z KS . The p-value for the KS statis-
tic is obtained by evaluating the limiting distribution of the KS statistic. Exact p-values can be 
computed, but we use the first 5 terms to form the approximate p-values.  
(4) The bivariate density estimate  ) ( ˆ z h  for a sample )} , {( } { i i y x = i z  is given by the formula  
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where N is the number of observation for  } { i z , V is the sample covariance matrix of the 
data, (.,.) K  is the standard bivariate normal distribution and  (.)
~
K  is the function such that 
) ( ) (
~
z z z
' K K = ; if  (.,.) K  is the standard bivariate normal,  ) (
~







(Silverman, 1986: p. 78). 
The independence assumption requires testing  ) ( ) ( ) , ( : 0 y g x f y x h H = . Ahmad and Li 
show (Pagan and Ullah, 1999: p.71) that under H0 and as  0 → h  and  ∞ →
2 Nh , 
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where (.) x K  is the kernel for  (.) ˆ f  and  (.) y K  is the kernel for  (.) ˆ g . 
(5) A local regression scatter plot smoother, known as lowess, fits a line to a scatter plot by 
estimating the relationship between y and x at a number of target points over the range of the ob-
served x values. It first identifies the q nearest neighbors of a target point x0, denoted by N(x0), 














Then it regresses y on (1,x) for local linear fitting, using weighted least squares. Repeating this 
procedure for each target point traces out a function, the smoothed fit of y against x. As in the case 
of density estimation, the calculated smoother clearly depends on the choice of a weight function 
and a bandwidth. The choice of a weight function is a minor issue; we chose the tricube weight 
function:  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ] 1 , 0 [
3 3 z z z W I − = . Bandwidths could be estimated using cross-validation or plug-
in methods as in the case of density estimates.   30
Appendix 4: Procedure of estimation and numerical computation 
 
I. Estimation of model parameters 
 
A. Distribution of voter types 
 
We explain the estimation of the real wage rate. The PSID sample consists of two independ-
ent samples: a cross-sectional national sample drawn by the Survey Research Center (SRC) and a 
sample of low-income families drawn from the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO); the latter 
sample is confined to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA’s) in the north and non-
SMSA’s in the southern region. To avoid the risk of over-sampling poor families, we drop the 
SEO sample, and base our calculation only on the SRC sample with positive taxable incomes.
10 
The PSID dataset in year s pertains to calendar year s-1; the labor market data for year s below 
were constructed from the PSID dataset in year s+1. The last election year in the current paper is 
1992. But the last year for which we can calculate income taxes, post-fisc income and pre-fisc in-
come from PSID is 1990 (using the 1991 PSID). Hence for 1992, we had to use the labor market 
information in 1990 contained in PSID 1991.
11 
Our real wage rate is the nominal wage rate computed from the PSID, adjusted by the CPI 
index (normalized to the 1984 level). (For the Consumer Price Index, see Table A-4-1 in Appen-
dix 1.)  
 
B. Estimation of observed tax rates and transfer payments ( obs t  and  obs b ) 
 
To calculate the observed marginal tax rates and transfer payments consistent with the affine 
tax scheme of our model, we regress post-fisc family income on pre-fisc family income with a 
constant term. 
                                                           
10 Positive taxable income at the family level does not necessarily mean that the wage rate earned by the male 
in the family is positive. 
11 Is the distribution of incomes among respondents in the NES close to the distribution of incomes among re-
spondents in the PSID? We compared percentile incomes in the NES with the corresponding percentile incomes in 
the PSID; we find that they are very similar. (See Table A-4-2 in Appendix 1.)  31
To run the regressions, we need to estimate post-fisc incomes. To calculate post-fisc family 
income, we first subtracted federal income taxes, social security taxes (paid by employees) and 
Medicare taxes (paid by employees) from the taxable (i.e., pre-fisc) family income, and then 
added government transfer payments received by each family. 
Federal income taxes paid by each household are already provided in PSID, but the other 
two taxes are not. We calculated them using the social security and Medicare tax rate table. (See 
Table A-4-1 in Appendix 1.) Since an individual’s retirement benefits are linked to past social se-
curity tax payments, treating all social security taxes as pure taxes is problematic. We treat the 
employee contribution as a pure tax, and ignored the employer contribution as in Triest (1990). 
For government transfers, we included the following: AFDC, SSI (Supplemental Security 
Income), other welfare, VAP (Veterans Administrations Pension), other retirement benefit, unem-
ployment benefit, worker's compensation, child benefit, government subsidy for heating costs, 
and monetary value of food stamps.
12 
 
C. Parameter values of the sub-utility function 
 
In Table A-4-3 in Appendix 1, we also report the wage rates of males and females, labor in-
comes and other incomes. They are used in calculating the ratios of female wage rates to male 
wage rates (k1) and of non-wage incomes to total pre-fisc incomes (k3).  
Table A-4-3 also reports the estimated value of C, which is equal to the difference between 
the mean of pre-fisc and post-fisc incomes.
13 
It remains to estimate the parameter vector that characterizes the labor supply functions, 
) , , , ( F M F M λ λ β β . Hausman (1981) and Triest (1990) estimated uncompensated wage elasticities 
of labor supply for both males and females for 1976 (Hausman) and 1984 (Triest) using non-
reduced form labor supply functions, which correspond to equations (13) and (14) in our model, 
                                                           
12 There may be some bias in our estimated post-fisc incomes. First, taxes reported in the PSID are calculated 
after taking out exemptions but not deductions. Also the post-fisc income does not include tax credits (such as child 
credit, or EIC). These two facts will generate a downward bias in the estimated post-fisc incomes.  
Second, we are unable to include the housing rent subsidy, and the monetary value of public education or public 
health (such as Medicaid), because there is no information about their value. This will also generate downward bias in 
the estimated transfer amounts and hence post-fisc incomes. 
13 If tax revenues are completely redistributed, then C must equal zero, because in that case, the sum of pre-fisc 
incomes across families is equal to the sum of post-fisc incomes.  32
and using the same methodology and the same dataset, PSID. (These elasticities are reported in 
Table A-4-3.
 14) 
Their estimates are based upon the assumption that husbands do not take into account the 
labor income of wives (i.e.,  F F F L w Y =  in our model) in making their labor supply decision,  
while wives do take into account the labor income of husbands. In the context of our model, the 

























































































= .                                  (39) 
We use the Triest estimates for all years since 1984 and the Hausman estimates for 1976 and 
1980 (assuming that the elasticity of labor supply does not change much over time). We estimate 
the four parameters  ) , , , ( F M F M λ λ β β  by solving the above four equations simultaneously while 
setting  0 = F Y  and substituting yearly estimated values of t and b and the mean values of working 
hours, O, YM, wM and wF into the equations. 
 
D. Observed party membership 
Our model identifies those who vote for a party with its membership, in equilibrium. It is 
useful to look at how party membership is distributed over voter types. We calculate the party 
membership probabilistically from the NES by looking at the fraction of citizens voting for party 
J in each of the 25 discrete voter types. The observed party membership for party D calculated in 
that way will be compared with the equilibrium party membership later (see Figure 5-2, for in-
stance).  
 
                                                           
14 They estimate elasticities by several methods; we chose those elasticities recommended in Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1991).  33
E. Remaining parameters 
 
There remain three un-estimated parameters in the utility function related to the equality 
term and the salience of racial issue: ) , , ( 2 0 γ δ δ .  
We apply equation (35) to estimate some of them. We ran probit regressions to estimate the size 








obs r r t E t E − γ − − δ , which appears as the size of the coefficient on the racism-
induced aid-to-blacks. The results are reported in Table A-4-5.  
Perception about the performance of the economy in the past is an important explanatory 
variable for vote shares of all years. Dropping this variable will cause some bias for the estimated 
coefficient. Unfortunately, information on this variable is not available for 1976. We ran two re-
gressions, one with the past-economy variable as a regressor (except 1976-1980) and the other 
without it. The coefficients are slightly different. We use the estimated coefficients from the re-
gressions with the past-economy variable included, except for 1976-80.
15 
 
II. Numerical computation 
 
For the full model, we use equations (28a & b)-(29a & b), which form a system of 4 equa-
tions in 6 unknowns (the four policy variables and the two Lagrangean multipliers). Consequently, 
we can expect to find a 2-manifold of solutions in the full model if there are any solutions. We 




R for the values of t
D and t
R, which was randomly cho-
sen from fine grids of the relevant domain, while checking  0 ≥
D x  and   0 ≥
R x . For the two 
counterfactual models, we solve the two equations (28a) and (29a) for x
D and x
R, while checking 
whether 0 ≥
D x  and   0 ≥
R x  hold.  
In the calibrations, we use the parameters and density functions estimated in section 4. Be-
cause there is one degree of freedom, we varied  0 δ  and determined  2 δ  and γ by the two esti-
mated equations: 


















obs r r t t ϕ = γ δ δ ϕ ) , , ; , , , ( 2 0 .                              (41) 
                                                           
15 Thus there may be some bias in our estimated coefficients in this period.  34
We found that the admissible range of  0 δ  is not wide. If  0 δ  is too small, γ or  2 δ  become 
negative. When  0 δ  is too large, equilibria fail to exist. (Recall that we have to find equilibria for 
all three models.) The admissible range of  0 δ  that allows us to obtain the equilibrium for all years 
and for all three models is approximately between 0.85 and 1.1. We have no way of estimating  0 δ . 
We carry out numerical computations with two parameter values:  9 . 0 0 = δ  and  1 0 = δ . We dis-
cuss the results for  1 0 = δ . The results for  9 . 0 0 = δ  are reported in Appendix 1 (Table A-5-1). 
As predicted by our model, we find many PUNEEPs.  PUNEEPS are graphically illustrated 
in Figure A-5-1 for selective years.  
PUNEEPs are somewhat scattered. But they are not uniformly scattered. To see whether 
they appear equally likely and what the likelihood of PUNEEPs would be if the same computation 
were carried out many times, we examined the likelihood functions of PUNEEPs for both parties. 
In particular, the likelihood function of the bargaining power of opportunist faction is highly con-
centrated for both parties. The mean values of the relative bargaining power of the Opportunists 
are approximately 0.5545 for party D and 0.4909 for party R.  
Because there are many PUNEEPs, we need summary statistics. Because PUNEEPs are 
concentrated, we take a weighted average, where weights are computed according to the follow-
ing rule: 
(1) For each year, we first compute the likelihood function of the bargaining power in each 
party and identify its mode (i.e., the value of the bargaining power that is most likely to appear). 
(2) For the i
th equilibrium, we then compute its weight for each party, 
J




















, where  (.) W  is a weight function and 
J
i α  is the bargaining power of 
the Opportunist in party J at the i
th equilibrium. We chose the popular tri-cube weight function 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ] 1 , 0 [
3 3 z z z W I − ≡ .
16 Thus if 
J
i α  is identical to the mode, the platform of party J in the i
th 
equilibrium gets the weight of 1; it is penalized as 
J
i α  moves away from the mode. 
(3) Finally we apply the computed weights to calculate the weighted average of each party’s 
platform vector. 
                                                           
16  ) ( ] 1 , 0 [ z I  is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if z is in the interval [0,1] and 0 otherwise. 